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This thesis is an examination of Japan ' s response to the
oil crisis of 1973. Intermediate measures to cope with rising
prices and restrictions on supplies of oil and petroleum
products were marginally effective, but inadequate as bases
for long term policies.
It will be shown that Japan has available to it five
major areas of alternate petroleum sources. The conclusion
emerges that no other area except the Middle East has suffi-
cient available supplies to meet Japan's needs.
The next section undertakes an estimate of alternate
sources of energy which might become available to Japan as
oil substitutes. Again, the conclusion is inescapable that
Japan will remain dependent on Mideast supplies for the fore-
seeable future and will, therefore, be constrained to make
such modifications and improvements in economic and diplomatic
procedures as to obtain maximum benefit at least cost to meet
her economic and security needs.
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I . INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY
The study of Japan's oil situation, requires a twofold
methodology- -statistical and conceptual. Either technique,
if taken by itself, would not yield a clear enough interpreta-
tion of the events which surrounded Japan's oil crisis.
A statistical evaluation of recent years ' production
levels, growth, drilling activities, proven reserves, market
trends, and crude shipments will provide the background
against which can be measured the relative validity of
statements and/or predictions made by analysts and policy-
makers. Tables are provided for the reader to examine and
use to arrive at his own conclusions.
A wide-ranging amalgam of sources has been collected and
synthesized. Conclusions are reached on the basis of a
general con ensus , weighted in favor of higher authorities.
The weighting mechanism is admittedly a subjective judgment.
Statements must be considered in an historical context as
well as the current one; a chronological format has been in-
corporated into the background description of the problem.
The conceptual framework for the study of Japan in her
reaction to the oil crisis demands a search for linkages,
causal relationships, and important variables. If these
linkages are found to be applicable to other situations, they
may contribute to an enhanced understanding of the variables
themselves. Such knowledge, through understanding, may help

policymakers to defuse the potential dangers inherent in
certain kinds of international relations .
Japanese foreign policies can be categorized in terms of
interests, goals, objectives, and methods. These terms are
familiar enough, but they are used in this thesis in the
following manner:
. . .The national interest represents the general
and continuing purposes that governments see
themselves as serving on behalf of the nation.
Essentially this refers to the enhancement of




Goals may be defined as the general, long-term,
and best conceivable outcomes that policy-makers
seek to establish during a time span that can be
reasonably anticipated ... vis-a-vis some other
nation or group of nations....
Ob j ectives . . . are the more precisely defined
shortrange preferred outcomes that are attain-
able at any particular time, given the existing
configuration of the domestic and international
environments. As such they represent specific
steps that are designed to achieve a particular
soal .
The methods which a nation such as Japan may choose to
achieve her particular objectives and goals are varied. As
the oil crisis came to the forefront in late 1973, Japan's
ability to cope was a function of basic constraints which
operate on any nation's ability to act. Which resources,
political, economic or military, were at Japan's disposal?
What were some of the constraints? Have these changed over
time?
Joseph S. Szyliowicz and Bard E. O'Neill, The Energy
Crisis and U.S. Foreign Policy , Praeger Publishers, New York,
1975, p. 7.

Being unable to project her military power, Japan had
virtually no military options at her disposal. The credibility
of her economic power may have been in question as well; Japan's
willingness to expend economic resources, specifically capital,
played a significant role in her handling of the oil crisis.
Japan took advantage of the fact that the world's economic
system is largely a system of interdependencies
. Even the oil
producers could not afford to lay the developed countries'
economies to waste.
If political interests, goals, and objectives are independ-
ent variables, the methods, or dependent variables in Japan's
situation must include her lack of military power, the magni-
tude of her industrial and technological resources, her large
capital reserves, her willingness to extend credit, and her
dependence upon both the U.S. market and OPEC energy sources.
Beyond those constraints, the structure of the inter-
national system imposes systemic limitations upon actions being
contemplated by Japan or other nations. Global and domestic
public opinions, treaty commitments, and the precedents of
international law also serve to modify, or even direct the
course of national policies.
An examination of the Japanese reaction to their oil
crisis is therefore expected to provide a better understanding
of Japanese national interests. This understanding should be
useful to American policymakers and pol icy- implementers when
called upon to deal with the intricacies of Japanese trade
negotiations, and U.S. foreign policy with respect to Asia.

II. THE OIL CRISIS OF 1975-74
"Necessity never made a good bargain"
- Benjamin Franklin
There was much consternation around the world as the full
impact of the Arabian oil embargo became known. The Organiza-
tion of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) , in the
winter of 1973-74, had not only cut their oil production to
a level well below the going demand, but had raised the
price of that oil by unprecedented increments. The economies
of the industrialized world lived and breathed by means of
petroleum and petro -products . To a greater or lesser degree,
every oil- importing country in the world felt the strong hand
of that Arabian embargo on its neck; it was an uncomfortably
firm hand.
Japan believed itself to be choking. More than any other
nation in the world, Japan depended upon imported oil for the
maintenance of its highly industrialized economy and its
energy requirements. The Japanese were in shock, in a panic,
groping around in all directions for a solution to their
predicament
.
In this study of the Japanese reaction to the oil crisis,
it is clear that the Japanese did not, until 1973 fully
appreciate the fact that their phenomenal economic growth over
the years depended so heavily upon a cheap source of energy.
10

Also Japan was ill-prepared, both politically and economically,
to cope with even the slightest interruption in that energy
flow; and the conditions have become such that Japan is unlikely
to extricate itself from the hazards of outside oil dependence
in the near term.
By way of a chronological presentation, this chapter will
attempt to point out the origins and the extent of Japan's oil
vulnerability, the state of the Japanese economy immediately
prior to and during the Arab oil embargo, and Japanese reactions
to their oil problem throughout the period of the crisis. As
a result, a better understanding of the unique Japanese energy
situation may be reached, and Japanese action during and after
this watershed in the world oil market can be understood on a
broader perspective.
A. THE SHIFT TO OIL
Japan has essentially no domestic oil supply. For all its
economic power, Japan is incredibly dependent (99.7 9s) on
imported oil. The result is a terrible vulnerability to
possible breakdowns or other threats to its oil shipping
routes
.
In fiscal year 1972, more than 90 percent of
Japan's oil came from sources not controlled by
the country's petroleum firms, almost four-fifths
of that from the Persian Gulf, in an amazing
night and day rotation of more than 250 tankers,
tailing each other less than 50 miles apart. z
"Leon Howell and Michael Morrow, "Asia, Oil Politics and
Energy Crisis," ( IDOC/ Internat ional Documentation/North America ,
Nos. 60-61: New York, NY, cl974) p. 47.
11

It was not, however, until quite recently that Japan came
to rely on oil for its source of industrial power and economic
growth
.
Japan Industrialized, as nations traditionally
did, on its own coal and hydroelectricity until
after World War 1 1... With the encouragement of
her U.S. occupiers, Japan decided to shift to
oil... Yet the need for capital and foreign
exchange presented a barrier; further, much of
the equipment and expertise was available only
from the U.S.
The choice was a bitter pill for the Japanese to swallow.
They wearied of the U.S. occupation and its impositions.
Rapid industrialization, however, was the motivating factor.
In 1950, therefore, the government took a
decision which it has since lived to regret but
which was probably unavoidable at the time. In
conflict with the traditional Japanese attitude
toward foreign participation in the country's
basic activities, the government agreed to allow
the major international oil companies to join
forces with the local refining companies. Each
party put up half the capital required ... and in
return for this procedure ... the foreign companies
putting up the money secured the permanent right
to supply all the crude oil ever needed by the
refineries
.
Due to the abundance of cheap oil available from the
Middle East, and the efficiency through which the American
companies sought to maximize their profits, the Japanese oil
industry prospered, grew, and contributed in significant




4 Peter R. Odell, Oil and World Power, (London: Penguin
Books, Ltd. 1975), pp. 1J4, I7TT
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Much has been written to describe Japan's economic development
during the 1950's and 60's. Edwin 0. Reischauer, a former U.S.
ambassador to Japan, wrote that "Unlike most countries, the
problem usually was to prevent more rapid growth than society
could adjust to. Commonly, the government set its goals at
7 or 8 percent growth in real terms, only to find the economy
had exceeded this by another 2 or 3 percent."5
A victim of what perhaps may be called "too much of a good
thing," Japan had opted for the immediate advantages of rapid
economic growth and industrial power, but had had to accept a
proportionate measure of the long-range disadvantages of en-
vironmental pollution and social restiveness in the bargain.
Even before the oil crisis became a reality, the Japanese
public had become increasingly critical of some of the byproducts
of economic growth, pollution, lack of social welfare expendi-
ture, and urban sprawl. These problems, together with the
destabilizing effects on the international monetary system
after the U.S. dollar was devaluated in 1971, were quite
disconcerting to most Japanese economists. Japanese scholar
Tsunehiko Watanabe wrote that after the revaluation of the yen
in 1971, which spurred fears of an impending economic recession,
Prime Minister Tanaka introduced new, expansionary fiscal and
monetary policies which were designed to restore the economy
to the 10 percent growth rate experienced all through the 1960 's.
The official discount rate was reduced from 4. 7 5 to 4.25 percent,
5 Edwin 0. Reischauer, Japan - The Story of a Nation (New York




supplemental government spending was authorized, and on the
exchange market, the outflow of capital was less restricted.
These expansionary measures worked too well. Economic indica-
tors showed that in the first quarter of 1973, Japan's GNP
(gross national product) increased at a rate equivalent to
17 percent per annum!
Concomitant to such growth in the GNP, Japan's inflation
rates began to increase dramatically as well. The progressive
increases in the annual rates of inflation are shown below in
a month-by-month assessment of Tokyo's "Consumer Price Index."
TABLE I
Percentage Increases Over Previous Year
Consumer Price Index - 19"5'
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP
6.2 6.7 8.4 9.4 10.9 11.1 11.9 12.0 14.6
By June of 1973, the problem was obvious, and inescapable
Increasing imports to Japan, high rates of borrowing and
spending, combined with high rates of inflation, forced the
Bank of Japan to attempt to "put the brakes" on the economy
by raising their prime discount interest rate to six percent.
In that same month, in response to increases in the price
of crude oil decided upon by the Oil Producing and Exporting
E. R. Fried and C. L. Schultze, eds
.
, Higher Oil Prices












Countries (OPEC), the British Petroleum Company announced that
it would have to add another ten cents per barrel to the price
of its oil shipments to Japan. Low sulfur Saudi light crude,
the standard by which other grades of oil are measured, then
stood at $2.30 per barrel.
B. THE IMPENDING CRISIS
In Japan the prices on food and housing continued to esca-
late. Land, already at a premium, was being bought up by
speculators, who were beginning to realize huge profits on its
resale. The "overheating" economy was showing no signs of
slowing down, so on the 28th of August, 1975, the Bank of Japan
again raised its discount rate to seven percent.
In Japan, rice is a primary staple food; the government
subsidizes the consumer by buying from the producers and selling
at a loss to the general public. This is a highly inflationary,
but highly popular, government policy which in 19^3 added 180
billion yen to the red; August saw a 16.1 percent increase in
the price paid to rice producers. The decision appears to
have been more political than economic in its rationale.
At this point, in August the government seemed to recognize
part of the problem, and admitted that it had failed to cope
adequately with Japan's spiraling inflation. The leadership












remedies: (1) find ways to reduce consumer demand; (2) promote
free market competition; and (3) calm the panic and fear among
the public concerning the prospect of runaway inflation
.
The summer of 1973 had been long and hot, and the demand
for electricity to power the air conditioners and refrigerators
and, at the same time, power the growing needs of industry,
was simply unprecedented. The energy crunch had become so
acute in fact, that the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI) published its first white paper on the subject.
The paper, released in early September, recommended that
certain policies be adopted in order to economize on the con-
sumption of oil, and that ways should also be found to protect
Japan's environment from the dangers of further industrial
pollution
.
The political situation continued to worsen for Prime
Minister Tanaka and his ruling, conservative, Liberal
Democratic Party. Land, which has always been considered to
be a good hedge against inflation for the private investor,
was in such demand that land prices had risen more than 4-0 per
cent over the previous year, and speculation continued
14
unabated. In the face of criticism for this and other torms
of inflation, Tanaka resorted to a traditional political tactic
12 Ibid., p. 468.
ljJapan Quarterly , "Chronology," Vol. XXI, No. 1, Jan-Mar 74,
p. 113.
Koji Nakamura, "Inflation Ever Up In Japan," Far Eastern
Economic Review
,
Vol. 82, No. 40, 8 Oct 73, p. 47.
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With the elections drawing ever nearer, and his party's popu-
larity dropping with the standard of living, he asked the LDP
to support his request to the Finance Ministry for an income
tax reduction amounting to 2 trillion yen in fiscal year 1974.
In oil-related matters, Japan and Britain agreed to go
ahead with a joint development project in the North Sea oil
fields. Three days later, on 5 October, Japan and West Germany
also agreed to cooperate closely in mutual acquisition of
energy resources and raw materials. However, on 25 October
Japan was greeted with news which could only be described as
"bad."
Oil majors notified local oil refineries that
shipment of crude oil to Japan will be cut by
10 percent, retroactive to October 18 at the
ports of loading, in the wake of a (16 Oct)
production cut by the Arab oil producing
states.^' (parenthesis added)
This was just too incredible. The Japanese felt that, at
the very most, this cut in production was just a war- related
device which was being brandished for only a temporary effect.
The war would be short, they theorized, and soon production
would be back where it belonged. Besides, Japan had 55 days'
supply of oil in reserve, and the pipelines were by no means
dry. Still, MITI thought it prudent to incorporate some
attempts at conservation, and the "consume less" campaigns
were quickly promulgated throughout the islands.









On 16 November the "Principles of Countermeasures" passed
the Cabinet. It described, in a general way, a national
energy- saving movement, and called for reductions in govern-
ment consumption of electricity and oil. On 19 November the
Cabinet expanded on the idea to include the private sector.
The iron and steel industries, auto manufacturers, heavy
machinery, electric appliances, petroleum, chemicals, tires,
synthetic fibers, aluminum, nonferrous metals, cement, sheet
glass, and paper and pulp industries were all strongly urged
1
8
to conserve oil. Other specifics included reductions in
television broadcasting hours, reduced numbers of authorized
flying hours for aircraft, a 60 kph speed limit on the highways,
restrictions over the use of private automobiles, heating (not
air conditioning) thermostats being set at 20 C, and neon sign
19
and shop window display illumination curtailment.
In November, the Director of the Economic Planning Agency
offered his "deep apologies" for failing to keep the nation's '
spiraling inflation under control. He also confessed his
20inability to do anything iurther about it."
Nevertheless, the government continued its campaign for
conservation of energy. The government called for a ten percent
reduction in the amounts of energy consumed by the large,
industrial users. The gas stations were ordered closed on
1 8
Yuan-li Wu , Japan's Search for Oil
,
Hoover Press,
Stanford, CA , 1977, p. 6.
1 Q
Koji Nakamura, "Japan: The Gear Shift Jams," Far Eastern




Sundays and holidays. Thermostats were to be lowered.
According to the Japan Quarterly , on 16 November "the govern-
ment estimated the effective cut in oil imports to be about
15.4 percent less than planned. Japan consumes about 260
million kiloliters of oil each year.
The 101 supply cut to eleven industries, accord-
ing to the Economic Planning Agency (EPA) will
reduce Japan's growth rate in fiscal 1973 by
about 2.9 to 8.1%. Industries affected are steel,
automobiles, petrochemicals, heavy and light
electrical manufacturing, tires, man-made fibers,
aluminum, non-ferrous metals, cement, plateglass,
paper and pulp.""
The Japanese were finally waking up to the awful reality
of what had befallen them. They had experienced economic
collapse before, with their defeat after World War II. They
had known hardships, and had coped before with scarcities of
consumer goods, rampant inflation, and hunger. They saw
history repeating itself. Their reaction to what they
perceived -- the end of the great bubble of Japanese prosperity
was understandable. Mothers and wives took their savings and
began to spend it at the marketplaces, determined to hoard or
stock up in preparation for the terrible times which they felt
surely would be upon them any day. Their ferver brought about
new problems of logistics.
21 Japan Quarterly , "Chronology," Vol. XXI, No. 1, Jan-Mar
74, p. 113.
22Koii Nakamura, "For Japan, Zero-Growth Pains," Far
Eastern Review , Vol. 82, No. 47, 26 Nov 73, p. 41.
19

To cope with dire shortages of daily neces-
sities throughout Tokyo, Osaka and other major
city areas triggered by the oil crisis, that
is, cuts in the crude oil supply by Arabian
states, the Ministry of International Trade
and Industry instructs detergent makers to
release about 1,000,000 cartons of detergents.
It also orders five major manufacturers to
increase production by 22 percent as compared
to the same period last year. The ministry
announces the release (on 22 Nov) of 1,200,000
packs, or 4,800,000 rolls, of toilet paper in
30 supermarkets in Tokyo and its three neigh-
boring prefectures . 23
Labor organizations such as Sohyo and Churitsuroren enlisted
over 2,200,000 persons to participate in nationwide demonstra-
tions protesting the unchecked problem of inflation, and asking
24for the government to impose price controls. "
Also in November, the Exxon Corporation informed the
Japanese that it would have to reduce its shipments of oil to
Japan by an additional 20 percent, retroactive to IS October
at the points of loading. -0 This cut was over and above the
original ten percent reduction.
Partly in response to such widespread pessimism, and partly
in recognition of the simple arithmetic of the deepening oil
crisis, the Dow- Jones index on the Tokyo Stock Exchange
plunged to its lowest ebb of the year (at that point) , a dismal
4,293.50 yen, down from January's high point of 5,359.74 yen. "26




24 Ibid., p. 117.




about reaching an understanding, an agreement, or a concession
with the OPEC states.
C. THE JAPANESE REACTION
Japan's official position on the Middle Eastern dispute
had always been one of neutrality. Japan depends entirely
upon the United States to cover the high costs of Japan's
strategic defense. As long as Washington supported Israel in
opposition to the Arab nations, Japan was hard-pressed to come
up with any policy, other than neutrality, which could hope to
avoid direct conflict with its own national interests. However,
if worse should come to worse, the ultimate realities of the
situation were clear enough. Trade between Israel and Japan
amounted to no more than $100 million dollars per year. In
contrast, Japan depended on Middle Eastern oil for 80 percent
? 7
of its total oil supply. - These kinds of issues were new to
Japan. Part of the reason was simply cultural.
The Japanese population has a mass abhorrence
...about considering questions of national
security and defense. As a result, within
the Japanese bureaucracy and political circles
the notion had grown up that economic matters
should be kept separate from political matters
(a policy known as Seikei Bunri) ... Japan
naively assumed that the rest of the world
would also accept its separation of economics
from politics. Japan had long believed that
Arab countries would treat it as a friendly
nation simply because it harbored no malice
toward the Arabs. 28
7 7
Koji Nakamura, "Japan vs the US: New Agonies," Far Eastern
Economic Review
,
Vol. 82, No. 45, 12 Nov 73, p. 36.
28Yoshi Tsurumi, "The Oil Crisis In Perspective: Japan,"
Daedalus, Fall 1975, Vol. 104, No. 4, p. 113.

Even before the oil crisis had even been considered possi-
ble, the Japanese had assumed that a neutralist policy, in the
end, would accomplish what alignment and alliance never could.
Japan has been extremely reluctant to become
involved, either in favor of the Arab or Israeli
side, or in favor of more active support of a
compromise settlement. Rather, as some Japanese
have frankly intimated, the Japanese calculate
that eventually the West will be driven from the
region and a neutralist position will make it
possible for Japanese interests to pick up the
pieces . ^9
To the surprise and dismay of the Japanese, OPEC did not
automatically consider them to be a friendly nation, nor were
they automatically to be accorded any special ration of oil.
To be sure, they were in limbo, and their status was uncertain
at first. However, Japan was certainly sharing the discomfort
of the oil supply reductions.
In September the Arab nations were producing
more than 20 million barrels per day (b/d)
.
About 15 million b/d (were) available at the
new production levels . Although those countries
marked 'hostile' by the Arabs (the U.S., Canada,
Holland, and South Africa) absorbed about 2.5
million b/d of the cutbacks, others were certain
to feel the pinch. Most Asian countries, es-
pecially those predominantly Muslim, were on the
'friendly' lis t ... Japan , with West Germany, Italy
and Scandinavia .. .were supposedly ranked some-
where in between. -^
As the crisis progressed, Japan's doubts, fears, and panic
intensified. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs turned to the
29 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Fragile Blossom , (New York: Harper
and Row, Publishers, 1972), p. 64.
j0
L. Howell and M. Morrow, "The Oil Storm Spills Into Asia,"
Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 82, No. 45, 12 Nov '3, p. 53.

United States for advice. Secretary of State Kissinger advised
the Japanese not to capitulate to OAPEC in their demands.
Kissinger felt that the interests of the oil consuming nations
(not to mention the Israeli interests) would be better served
if the "oil weapon" were met by a firm wall of unified resist-
ance. The Japanese were not convinced. Rumors were prevalent
in Japan that Kissinger and the Israelis had formed a con-
spiracy designed to play havoc with the world economy for the
benefit of Israel and the United States.
According to one version of the conspiracy, the
United States was happy to see the foreign
exchange reserves of Japan and West Germany
drained off to the United States via the OPEC
nations. The Kissinger-conspiracy theory,
combined with the spreading suspicion that the
American-based oil majors were diverting oil to
the United States at the expense of Japan, was
sufficient to convince Japan that it should
endorse QAPEC's position in the Middle Eastern
dispute ST
On 22 November the Japanese government issues four proposi-
tions concerning a solution to the problems in the Middle East.
1. The acquisition and occupation of territory
through military force is not to be allowed.
2. Israel should withdraw from all territories
occupied since the war of 1967.
3. The integrity and safety of every nation's
territory should be respected and the means
provided to ensure this
.
4. To ensure a fair and continuing peace in the
Middle East, the rights of the Palestinians,
as per the Charter of the United Nations,
should be acknowledged and respected ... Toward
the end the Japanese statement alluded to a_^
review of its policy in relation to Israel. 5 -
Yoshi Tsurumi, op. cit., p. 124.
32Miyoshi Shuichi, "Oil Shock," Japan Quarterly , Vol. XXI,
No. 2, April-June 74, pp. 148, 149.
2 3

The Japanese proposals, which were a significant departure
from their previous position, did not come as a complete
surprise to the rest of the world. A nation can be suffocated
economically just as surely as it can be destroyed militarily.
Japan had been threatened; pressure had been applied. Japan
was being forced to modify its foreign policy under duress.
(This isn't a new idea. This is exactly the purpose behind
any introduction of a coercive "weapon" into the international
political arena.) Relatively defenseless, Japan had no military
option available. Japan's Self Defense Forces are strictly
oriented, both militarily and politically, to nothing more
than a short-term defense of the home islands.
All that remained to the Japanese were three choices: (1)
find or develop new sources of oil, (2) learn to live with
less oil, and perhaps even less oil as time progressed, or
(5) reestablish good, even friendly, relations with the oil
producing countries. The latter choice was the most expedient
option, and was accomplished most expeditiously.
Some Japanese in a face-saving stance will deny that the
embargo "pressured" them into a significant policy shift.
They will cite their longtime support for the 196" United
Nations Resolution #242 of the Security Council as proof of
a consistent support for the OAPEC cause. Also, Japan's own
"Peace Constitution" declares that it cannot accept the right
of any nation to acquire or hold territory through the use of
military force. Combined with the reality of Japan's affirma-
tive vote for the 1971 U.N. Resolution concerning self-
determination for the Palestinian people, Japan's recent
24

contributions of foreign aid for the relief of the Palestinian
refugees were believed to prove out the point that Japan was,
and deserved to be called, a "friend" of the Arab nations.""
If such were actually the case, and Japan had been a
"friend" all along, the question that comes immediately to
mind is why the Arab nations ever allowed their restrictions
on oil to Japan to continue as long as they did. One explana-
tion might be that OPEC was looking for a more direct and
forceful endorsement for their cause than Japan had yet
supplied. Another reason might have centered around the
strategic aspects of "sealing off" the United States from
any possible source of Arab oil, which meant that the oil
had to be stopped prior to reaching Japanese storage facilities
Japan may claim that they have always supported the basic
Arab causes; to disguise any "loss of face," they may even
now insist that they had not given in to the "oil weapon."
Still, it is doubtful that any unilateral, statements concern-
ing the Middle East would ever had proceeded from the mouths
of Japanese diplomats had their national interests not been
in jeopardy.
Reaction in the United States to news of the Japanese
concessions was understandably negative, but not bitter. It
was feared at first that Japan's position would weaken
Kissinger's negotiating leverage. However, the U.S. limited




diplomatic vernacular, is considered to be a mild sort of
disapproval
.
This moderate U.S. reaction was due to several
factors: Japan's vulnerability in terms of
energy had been acknowledged the previous
summer at high level negotiations in Washington;
the United States could not guarantee adequate
supplies of appropriately priced oil; and Tokyo
avoided any extreme action, such as terminating
diplomatic or economic relations with Israel. 34
The goal of Japan's energy policy is to obtain
assured supplies of energy at minimum cost.
Because of Japan's unique dependence on imports,
the security objective must take precedence
over cost considerations. Of all the energy
importers, Japan is least able to join in any
action which entails risking even a brief inter-
ruption of Middle East petroleum shipments.
Similarly, Japan has the strongest reasons to
pursue closer diplomatic and economic ties with
the oil exporters.-1 ^
Therefore, in the short-term, the only way for Japan to
solve its immediate energy problem and renew its supply of
oil is to court the OAPEC and submit to the Arab political
will. For the Japanese, this is very embarrassing, and very
worrisome, for they are still every bit as vulnerable to such
coercion in 1978 as they were in 1973.
Oil accounts for nearly three- fourths of Japan's total
energy supply. Because of this dangerous dependence on a single
source of energy, the Japanese government began immediate steps
toward diversification. In December of 19~3, plans were being
34
J. S. Szyliowicz and B. E. O'Neill, eds . , The Energy Crisis
and U.S. Foreign Policy (Mew York: Praeger Publishers, 1 9
7
5 ) , p. 195
E. W. Erickson and L. Waverman, eds., The Energy Question:
An International Failure of Policy , Vo 1 . L , (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press
,
19 74 ) , p~! 11 5 .
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made to reactivate domestic coal production in preparation
for future energy requirements. Such production may be further
enhanced by future breakthroughs in coal technology. Japanese
coal, however, is not plentiful.
On 18 December the Dow-Jones Index on the Tokyo Exchange
dropped to 5,958.57 yen. The oil crisis was blamed, but also
there had been rumors that the Bank of Japan was about to raise
the discount rate, and heavy selling followed. J The Bank of
Japan did, indeed, raise its discount rate to 9 percent, on
21 December, in an effort to combat the extreme rates of in-
flation. December saw 11% higher consumer prices than the
39previous year.
On 15 December an Asahi Shimbun poll revealed that dissatis-
faction over rising commodity prices accounted for the fact that
only 12% of the public still supported the Tanaka Cabinet, down
from 62% when he took power in 1972. Times were grim.
The Japanese Shipbuilders Association gave this
somber picture of the si tuation . . . With refueling
becoming increasingly difficult in the Persian
Gulf, Singapore and many other ports, most ships
would have to carry sufficient bunker oil supplies
for the return voyage to Japan. As the tanker
fleet would be excluded from any cutbacks, the
bunker oil supplies to the rest of the non-tanker
fleet would dwindle. Cuts of this kind would have
savage effects... on the raw material and export
situation of Japan. 1
Henry Hymans , "Oil Eclipses the Rising Sun," Far Eastern
Economic Review
,
Vol. 82, No. 50, 17 Dec 73, p. 40.
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Henry Hymans, op. cit., p. 39.

So the oil shortage was also restricting the amounts of
raw materials available to the Japanese industries. Most of
the news as to what had happened was either too foreign, too
technical, or the consequences too indirect for the majority
of the general public to reall/ understand. Many people
suspected the entire oil industry to be conspiring in some
sort of plot against the consumer. A better explanation is
in order.
Saudi Arabia's abundant and popular "light" crude
often serves as a base for price calculations.
First, the six OPEC members named a 'market' price
of $3.65 f.o.b. for one barrel of Arabian light.
They called this a \1% increase in the prevailing
market price: that would imply a cost of about
$3.12 before October 16. But India, Japan and
other purchasers paid closer to $2.80 to $2.35
beforehand; therefore the increase in their market
price was closer to 28% ... (Royal ties involve a
complicated set of sums, but, roughly, come to
about 60% of the posted price.42
In the period immediately prior to 1973, the rapid increases
in demand for oil had allowed the market value to actually
exceed the posted price. The producing companies, who computed
and collected their profits as a function of the posted price,
were obviously unhappy with that situation, and collectively
through OPEC, forced a price increase upon the consuming nations
By using their collective, cartel power, OPEC raised the market
price of their oil. The posted price, always an arbitrary
figure, was arbitrarily set at a value which was 40* higher
L. Howell and Michael Morrow, "Inside the Arab Mind,"
Far Eastern Economic Review
,
Vol. 8 2, No . 49, 10 Dec 73, p . 50
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than the market price. OPEC declared that the posted price
would always maintain this 40% relationship, within 1%, even
through the actual market price might vary considerably. The
post-October 16 market price was set at $3.65 per barrel;
adding 40%, the new posted price became $5,119 per barrel.
Up until that time the oil companies had been able to
pass any price increases along to the consumers. The new OPEC
policy hampered them in this, however, because they found that
if they raised their market price, they would automatically
trigger off the 40% relationship with the posted price, and
just add to OPEC ' s earnings.
On 22 December the Japanese government declared itself to
be in a state of emergency in connection with the oil crisis.
It stated its intention to implement, beginning with the new
year, a further 20% reduction in electrical power supplies
based on September's levels. ° The state of emergency gave it
the authority to incorporate into national policy some of the
toughest anti- inflationary measures ever undertaken. Some of
the proposed measures are listed here.
1. The new budget reduced public spending (for the first
time since 1956) .
2. The discount rate was raised to 9 percent.
3. Controls would be placed on oil distribution and
commodity pricing.









4. New road construction curtailment
.
5. The 2,000,000 million yen tax cut, which Tanaka had
promised, was reduced to 'only' 1,450,000 million yen.
Finance Minister Fukuda said the tax cuts would
threaten the anti- inflation drive and should be
reconsidered. Obviously too many government
members had next year's House of Councillors




A twenty percent energy reduction would be imposed on
certain major industries.
7. Restrictions were placed on holiday motoring. Gas
stations were closed on holidays.
47
8. Daylight savings time was given year-round status.
Apparently, certain entrepreneurs were taking advantage of
the panic, and boosting their prices without regard to holding
to a fair or moderate profit margin. These practices only
fueled the fires of inflation. Japanese businessmen are not
immune to the temptations of greed.
While consumers across the country are complaining
that they cannot get enough heating oil from retail
shops and filling stations, as many as 288 oil
dealers were found cornering and concealing, during
the month of November, 2,009,394 liters of kerosene,
gasoline as well as light and heavy oil, an amount
equivalent to 10,047 drums, or enough to meet the
demand of 58,636 households for a month, according
to the results of a study conducted by the Asahi
Shimbun .
^
46 Koji Nakamura, "Japan Braces For Crisis ' 74 ','' Far Eastern
Economic Review
,




"Chronology," Vol. XXI, No. 2, Apr-Jun - 1,
p. 217.

When OAPEC declared its intention on 23 Dec 73, to double
the price of oil, the dollar's future market took a giant leap
49
upward. The yen was in trouble.
At this point the Japanese believed they were on a sinking
ship. Their much vaunted economy was in trouble, inflation
was eating away at the yen, the oil companies had cut their
deliveries, and now Japan even doubted that she could afford
to pay for the oil that was available. This must have been
the lowest, most miserable point of the oil crisis for the
Japanese
.
On 25 December the Diet passed two bills, the Oil Supply-
Demand Adjustment Bill and the Livelihood Stabilization Emergency
Measures. These bills asked for the following: (1) Voluntary
reductions in private auto use, (2) a 10% reduction in industrial
oil and electricity allocations, (3) a 5-day work week, (4)
voluntary gas station closures on holidays, [5) direct, govern-
ment control over supply, demand, and price functions within
* u t 5the Japanese economy.
Deputy Prime Minister Mikitakeo set out in mid-December on
a desperate mission to the eight nations of the Middle East,
hoping to work out a fair solution to the Middle East disputes
and somehow ensure a stable supply of oil to Japan. Perhaps













On 26 Dec 73, the OAPEC had announced that Japan would be
given "preferential treatment" with respect to its oil supply
requirements. Stocks on the Tokyo Exchange took a sudden
turn upward.
There were mixed feelings among the Japanese concerning
the two OAPEC announcements. While it was true that being
given "preferential treatment" was better than nothing, the
new price increase was stunning. OAPEC had decided to use
the other side of its double-edged "oil weapon." Cutting
production was one thing, but doubling the price again seemed
to impose a disproportionate burden upon the lesser developed
nations of the world who could not afford to pay the price.
Many were outraged. Here was the new situation.
Under the new arrangement, the posted price...
went from $5,119 to $11.65 for Arabian light
crude... The new production dictates will keep
oil flowing at 151 below September's levels,
except for 'friendly nations.' Japan and
apparently the Philippines have just been
given that status. ^3
So, apparently, if a nation is friendly, it may have all
the oil it needs, but at a premium price. OPEC argues that
as long as their oil is a finite resource, and since the demand
for that oil among the consuming nations seems to support the
new price, then the price increase was justified. The added
revenues will be invested in and toward the economic development
o2 Ibid., p. 215.
L. Howell and M. Morrow, "The Energy Game: Asia Loses,"
Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 82, Mo. 53, 7 Jan 74, p. 26.

of the producing countries, in preparation for the day when
there is no more oil.
D. OIL DIPLOMACY
In an attempt to prepare for its own energy future, Japan
dispatched a number of high-level dignitaries to the producing
countries of the world. The Japanese objective was to establish
direct, government- to - government relations with these countries,
54bypassing the multinational oil conglomerates.
During his trip of 10-28 December 1973, Deputy Prime Minister
Miki
,
Takeo visited Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, Qatar,
Syria, Iraq and Iran. He pledged $280 million in loans to Egypt
to help them dredge the Suez Canal. He also began negotiations
for Japanese construction of chemical , oil, steel and copper
refining facilities in Saudi Arabia.
Prime Minister Tanaka, Kakuei, between 7 and 17 January,
1974, visited the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia,
and Indonesia --all members of ASEAN. Malaysia received 5100
million in credit, and Indonesia was pledged $200 million for
development of LNG facilities, an aluminum refinery, and oil
storage facilities at Lombok.
From 7-18 January MITI director Nakasone, Yasuhiro, visited
Iran, Iraq, the U.K. and Bulgaria. Iran obtained a $1000
million credit with Japan to build a huge oil refinery. Iraq
54 The following discussion of trip itineraries is outlined
in more detail in Yuan-li IVu , Japan's Search for Oil, op. cit.,
pages 4 -6 .
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was extended $1000 million in credit for an oil refinery,
plus a LPG plant, $350 million for a petrochemical complex,
and $150 million for a cement factory. In return, Iraq agreed
to supply Japan with 160 million tons of crude oil and LPG
over the next ten years, with an option to 200 million tons.
Past Foreign Minister Kosaka, Zentaro, visited Morocco,
Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Jordon, Sudan, Lebanon, and Yemen
between 15 January and 2 February 19 74. Algeria received
$40 million for an oil refinery, and further oil and gas
exploration. Morocco and Jordon received $10 million for
a communications network. Sudan received $10 million for a
fertilizer plant.
"One Japanese estimate has put the total amount of credits
thus pledged in Japan's 'resource diplomacy' in the critical
winter of 1973-74 at 5.3 billion." 00
That figure is slightlv mitigated by the fact that Iran
cancelled its deal for the $1000 million oil refinery on
4 March 1974. b6
When the world builds its industry and consumer markets
under the assumption that a certain commodity, oil would be
a stable source of energy--and when this assumption involves
massive outlays of capital investment incorporating the
processing, distribution, and utilization of this energy--it
is foolish to assume that the resultant demand for that
Wu, op . cit .
, p . 5
.
SIPRI, Oil and Security, Humanities Press, NY, 1974, p. II
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commodity will fluctuate in rapid conjunction with rapid
changes in price. For the producing nations to assume that
demand, which appears inelastic with respect to the price of
oil, will therefore sustain rapid and arbitrary price increases
within relatively short periods of time is probably fallacious
logic. New technologies are becoming available, and new sources
of oil and energy are being found and developed in order to
circumvent the Arabian cartel. If successful, demand for
Arabian oil will indeed level off or even fall, leaving OPEC
with a surplus of unsaleable, greasy, black stuff.
The point has been made that, no matter what the dismal
projections on oil supplies may indicate, there will be
surplus oil available for a long time, perhaps 25 more years.
There is a catch, however; one must have the money to pay for
its production.
Available or not, Asia's developing countries
cannot afford oil. The rising cost of naphtha
alone will have dramatic effects on agriculture.
Fertilizer costs will continue to rise. Less
will be used when more should ... .All industrial
materials will cost mo re. 58
In view of the plight of the Third World's developing
countries, or any of the shakier economies of the industrialized
world, OPEC apparently felt that some conciliatory remarks were
in order. On 27 Jan 74, the Saudis made an interesting remark.
L. Howell and M. Morrow, "Arab Actions Alarm Asia,"
Far Eastern Economic Review , Vol. 82, No. 44, 5 Nov "3, p. 42.
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Saudi Arabian Oil Minister Sheikh Ahmed Zaki
Yamani at a Tokyo press conference disclosed
his nation's readiness to lower the oil price.
He also declared that Saudi Arabia will supply
oil to countries resolved to help his country
develop its industry. ^9
On 18 Feb 74, in a Tokyo meeting between Deputy Prime
Minister Miki and his Egyptian counterpart, Mohammed Abdul
Hatem, Japan pledged to extend 30 billion yen credit in economic
aid to the United Arab Republic. Two days later Hatem made
an additional request for a billion dollar loan in exchange
for Egyptian efforts to persuade the Arab nations to lower
their oil prices, a request which Japan ignored.
Japan has contributed mightily to the industrialization
efforts of the oil producing nations, especially Iraq and
Kuwait. No discounts in oil prices are yet evident.
It is known that Middle Eastern oil can be produced for
20-50 cents per barrel. In contrast, Japan's import bills,
at $5 ,046 million dollars, were up 400 percent over the previous
year for the month of January, 1974. The increase was due in
6 2large part to the tremendous increase in the price of oil.
This is not a natural or justifiable economic condition.
59 Japan Quarterly
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No thoughtful American can have failed to
appreciate that, whether justified by past
events or not, the nations of OPEC and partic-
ularly the Arab oil producers, are practicing
wholesale extortion with the present rigged
prices, and they are cheerfully engaging in
blackmail as to U.S. guarantees of Israel's
integrity. Since they clearly do not have
the military power to sustain them in the
face of American intervention, they are, in
the ultimate sense, relying on the armed
forces- -specifically the naval forces--of the
Soviet Union to protect them. This they may
or may not fully comprehend. J
"Politics, exposed to petroleum pressure, has a dangerous
proclivity to explode. °
E. THE CONTINUING CRUNCH
"On January 24, 1975, Prime Minister Miki . . . told the
Japanese Diet that he regarded the question of xArab oil as
being indivisible from the Arab-Israeli conflict.
One can imagine more than one reason for Miki having made
that statement to his peers. First, it appears as though he
is trying to re-emphasize the fact that economics and politics
go hand- in-hand, especially in the Middle East. The Japanese
had tried, previously, to ignore this fact, and were brutally
reminded of it in late 1973. Second, given the continued
vulnerability of the Japanese to irregularities in their oil
supply, Japan must realize that any recurrence of fighting in
the Middle East will probably have a serious impact on Japan
Howard Backnell III, Energy Policy and Naval Strategy
Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1975), p. 54.
64
L. Howell and M. Morrow, "Asia's Own Persian Gulf," Far
Eastern Economic Review
,
Vol. 82, No. 50, 17 Dec "5, p. 42.
Yoshi Tsurumi, op. cit., p. 115.
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as well. Third, until a resolution is reached in the Middle
Eastern dispute, the "oil weapon" will remain a threat to
Japan and the other consuming nations of the world.
The massive increase in the price of oil has caused
numerous other problems to develop, one of the most significant
of which is the transfer of the world's real resources to the
OPEC nations. The balance of payments in international trade
has been upset by disproportionate payments to the Middle East.
OPEC countries are presently investing in
financial assets of one form or another close
to $50 billion annually in the o il -consuming
countries. The accumulation of these 'surplus
petro -dollars , ' together with unremitted
interest and dividends, constitutes massive
indebtedness of the importing countries that
sooner or later they must repay by exports of
goods and services to OPEC countries at far
above present levels. The potential size of
such transfers of real resources is enormous-
-
several hundred billion dollars by the end of
the decade... The developed consuming countries
need to find means to channel recycled petro-
dollars deposited with them into productive
investment and not merely into financing
existing or higher levels of consumption by
underwriting deficits on current accounts. °6
As a defense against complete bankruptcy in the consuming
nations, the idea of an import tax on foreign oil has been
considered. Such a tax, however, would require the unified
cooperation of the consuming countries to apply the tax
evenly over the majority of OPEC's oil market. The Inter-
national Energy Agency would most likely be the vehicle for
such a tax.
Sperry Lea, Higher Oil Prices: Worldwide Financial
Impl ications (Washington, DC : British-North American Committee,
1975)




As to OPEC's reaction to an IEA import tax,
there is not a great deal it could do. Most
OPEC members are so dependent on export
revenues that another embargo is unlikely; in
any case the 1973-74 embargo was largely in-
effectual in cutting off oil supplies to the
embargoed countries. The main adverse effect
of an import tax might be a reinforcement of
political cooperation within the cartel."'
Edward Fried and Charles Schultze of the Brookings Institution
have offered the following two-stage synopsis of the overall
impact of the oil crisis.
The initial impact of the oil price increase meant that
(1) consumers paid more for energy, and spent less on other
products; (2) sales being down, output and employment had to
be reduced in the consumer goods industries; (3) the economy
was being depressed, but the high prices of gasoline, oil,
petrochemicals, electricity and petroleum-related products
combined to force an overall inflated condition; (4) wages
were forced upward in response to the higher prices; (5) prices
followed wages, and cost-push inflation resulted.
The second stage of the oil price increase became evident
in 1975. (1) Demand for oil had become increasingly restrained
by the higher prices. (2) A gradual elasticity for oil was
evidenced through conservation and the slow replacement of oil
by alternate sources of energy. (3) Overall prices were higher
and the Consumer Price Index was higher than it otherwise would
have been had there been no "oil crisis." (4) All this resulted
in a reduced standard of living, because more economic resources
Hendrick S. Houthakker, The World Price of Oil: A Medium
Term Analysis (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research, 1976), p. 33.
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are required now to pay for each unit of energy consumed.
A black picture for the future of the energy situation is
painted by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.
By 1985 we estimate that demand for OPEC oil
will reach 47 to 51 million b/d. Even if all
other OPEC states produce at capacity, Saudi
Arabia will be required to produce between 19
and 25 million b/d if demand is to be met.
This is well above present Saudi capacity of
10 to 11 million b/d, and projected 1985 ca-
pacity of at most 18 million b/d .. .Alternative
oil supplies are not likely to come on stream
rapidly enough to significantly alter the situ-
ation ... Non-oil energy supplies cannot be
counted on to appreciably relieve the problem
between now and 1985. 69
It should be remembered, however, that as the price of oil
increases, the quantitites which become economically available
are increased. The prices may be higher, the standard of
living for the consuming public may be reduced, but the oil
will be there to perform the necessary tasks to which it is
assigned
.
In summary, the so-called "oil crisis" of 19^3 was signifi
cant to Mid-Eas t/ Japanese relations because it pointed up
Japan's dangerous dependency on the coalition of the oil-
producing nations. Japan discovered that it was very much at
the mercy of OPEC, and the Japanese saw that America, while
not quite so dependent on imported oil as Japan, was either
unable or unwilling to reduce further its consumption in order
E. R. Fried and C. L. Schultze, eds
.
, op. cit., pp. 4-6
69 Central Intelligence Agency, The International Energy
Situation: Outlook to 1985
,
(Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office, April 1977), pp. 1, 2.
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to help Japan weather the oil embargo. In the absence of U.S.
support, Japan had no choice but to submit to the political
demands of the producing states. Japan, recognizing this to
be a rather undesirable position in which to be, has since
sought to diversify its oil and energy supplies. It has met
with limited success. Even in 1978, Japan depends on oil from
the Middle East to meet over 70 percent of its oil requirements.
Japanese/U.S . relations during a future oil embargo will
depend on the nature of the OPEC position, and the nature of
the decrease in the oil supply. If the U.S. perceives an OPEC-
sponsored threat to its national interests, it has been suggested
7that comparable countermeasures would be enacted.' The
likelihood of a fifth Arab-Israeli war, and resultant reductions
in the flow of oil from that region, are very high. It is in
both the United States and Japan's interests to encourage a
reduction of tension in the Middle East.
70 On 21 November 19/3, U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger
stated, "It is clear that if the Arab shutdown of oil to the
United States continues unreasonably and indefinitely, the
United States will have to decide what countermeasures are
necessary." ("Kissinger Says Oil Ban Will Not Change US
Policy," International Herald Tribune , 22 Nov 73). Then on
7 January 1974, Defense Secretary James Schlesinger said, "It
is plain that one should not tempt fate by pushing the concept
of national sovereignty too far. The United States is dedicated
to the independence of free states, and that includes the state
of the Middle East. But it should be recognized that the inde-
pendent powers of sovereign states should not be used in such
a way as would cripple the large mass of the industrialized
world. That is running too high a risk, and it is a source of
danger not only from the U.S. standpoint but from the standpoint
of the oil-producing nations." (J. R. Schlesinger, "Arabs
Risking Use of Force," International Herald Tribune . 8 Jan r l).
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A second forecast, which is also quite probable, is that
production simply will not be able to keep pace with demand,
and a shortage will occur in the supply of oil. Prices will
increase in response to the higher demand. Japan will emerge
as a direct competitor with the United States in its bid to
secure the oil which it requires to survive.
42

III. THE SEARCH FOR OIL
A. CHINA AS AN OIL SOURCE
China has been perceived by many observers as being a vast
untapped resource with enormous potential. The sheer weight
of China's massive population, now over 900 million people,
commands the respect of her enemies, and the attention of entre-
preneurs the world over. Since the oil crisis of 1973, Japan
and a number of other oil importers have speculated over the
likelihood of tapping into a barter situation with China. The
hope is that if sufficiently stable relations can be achieved
with the PRC , and if China agrees to import the appropriate
drilling technology and equipment, a great deal of oil might
then be introduced into the world markets. That prospect
has a special appeal to Japan, who in any case would like to
improve her relations with China. The added advantage of
having the oil supply so near at hand would be in reduced
import costs, and in the minimization of the length of Japan's
oil "life-line" which presently stretches to the Persian Gulf.
Hopeful as the Japanese may be, other parties are not so
optimistic. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency has qualified
its assessment of China's reserves with an element of uncertainty
Actually, not even the Chinese know the size of
their reserves. While we have no evidence that
China's reserves are on the Middle East scale,
we nonetheless believe they are considerable.
Working with limited information, experts in
academia, oil companies, and the U.S. Geological
Survey generally agree that China's onshore oil
reserves are comparable with the 39 billion barrels
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remaining in the United States. We share this
view. Offshore, the latest studies are dampen-
ing earlier hopes that the eastern continental
shelf might be one of the world's most prolific
oil and gas reservoirs. The most optimistic
estimates now suggest offshore oil reserves are
about the same as those onshore. 7i-
The question of onshore and offshore drilling sites is a
matter of interest here. China's onshore fields are old,
producing near capacity with present Chinese technology.
While better equipment would yield more oil, the offshore
potential remains largely untapped. China wants very much
to develop her oil resources without the assistance of the
"exploitive capitalists." Self-reliance is the key to China's
policy on this issue. The offshore reserves, which are said
to rival the onshore deposits, have simply not been developed.
The problem is larger than the political question of self-
reliance, however.
China's continental shelf extends well into waters presently
claimed by Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines,
Malaysia, and Vietnam. The South China Sea appears to hold the
most potential for future oil production, but until China has
sufficiently prepared itself to defend against any infringements
or incursions on its claims to these contested areas, she is apt
to remain conservative in her involvement. Certainly there will
be no Chinese drilling in the contested waters until China has
both the technology and the naval capability to protect her
investments
.
71 China Oil Production Prospects
,
Central Intelligence Agencv,
*ER77-1005OU, June 77, Washington, DC, p. 1.
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According to Selig Harrison, a noted "China-watcher," the
potential Chinese threat to any drilling rig in contested
waters is sufficient to discourage any further outside invest-
ment from taking place.
Some observers have suggested that the develop-
ment of the contested offshore areas will be
delayed until sea boundary settlements can be
reached. . .This view is supported by the element
of vagueness in the Chinese stand on Law of the
Sea issues as they apply to Asia. By avoiding
a precise definition of its attitude toward
possible boundary settlements, Peking helps to
paralyze offshore oil and gas production until
it is prepared to play its hand
.
; -
Aside from the political issues surrounding the offshore
oil potential, what other problems is China facing with respect
to increased oil production? Briefly, her problems must be
outlined under the following areas: (1) China will need
massive capital investments and infusion of costly technology
at the expense of other priorities; (2) new technology must be
developed to hasten China's access to
_ her offshore reserves;
(5) there still exists the necessity to establish, in China,
the proper organizational structure for a complex industry,
coordinating exploration, production, distribution, transporta-
tion, and sales functions.
The transportation of oil presents special
problems. With the exception of Shengli and
Takang, major oil fields are situated far from
industrial centers and often close to foreign
borders. Yet railroad, barge, and truck capac-
ities are already overburdened. Port facilities
for coastal and outbound shipping are known to be
7 1
"Selig S. Harrison, "Time Bomb in East Asia," Foreign
Policy
, #20, Fall 1975, p. 22.
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inadequate, as are cargo vessels and tankers...
Progress has been made in building long-distance
pipelines, but many obstacles are being encoun-
tered . 73
(4) Obviously mobility is a problem within China, and will
need to be addressed as a matter of high priority in the
future. According to Park and Cohen, China has purchased, in
the space of a year and a half, 120 ships from Japan alone,"
...of which more than 60 percent were for dredging and improv-
74ing ports." Apparently, the Chinese are working toward a
solution to this particular problem even now.
So far as Japan's dreams of expanded trade relations with
China are concerned, it can at least be said that the Japanese
have their foot in the door.
As usual, Japan was China's leading trade partner
in 1976 and as 1977 drew to a close, seemed
assured of maintaining the top spot i _with a total
turnover of about US$ 3000 million. f
D
More progress can be expected as a result of the signing of
the Sino- Japanese treaty of peace and friendship on August 12,
1973 .
A full text of the Sino- Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty
is provided in the Appendix.
Choon-ho Park and Jerome Alan Cohen, "The Politics of
China's Oil Weapon," Foreign Policy
,
#20, Fall 1975, p. 56.
Ibid .







With the ink only just dry on the Aug 12
China-Japan peace treaty, Japanese officials
and businessmen are losing little time in
stepping up the already considerable economic
cooperation between the two countries .. .China '
s
complete plant -purchases in the next decade
are expected to reach about $30 billion...
Japanese economists anticipate Sino- Japanese
trade will double in the next three years,
and crude oil imports from China to increase
six times in the coming 12 years .. .Japan will
be importing 7 million tons of Chinese crude
this year. 76
Since the peace and friendship treaty has been signed,
Japan can concentrate on expanding its trade relations with
the PRC . Even though oil production in China is increasing,
reaching 1.69 million b/d in 1976, exports dropped in that
year to 200,000 b/d from the previous level of 240,000 in
771975. '
Japan must be aware that China's domestic requirements are
rapidly increasing, and it is conceivable that China may need
all of its oil for its own development once its distribution
system is more complete. The CIA believes this will happen.
On balance, we believe that China will produce
2.4-2.3 million b/d by 1980. Most of this oil
will be needed for domestic consumption; exports
are likely to be only 200,000-600,000 b/d.
Within a decade or so, continuously expanding
demand will absorb total capacity unless deposits
in the west or offshore are proved and exploited
much more rapidly than expected. '^
7 f\
V. G. Kulkarni, "Japan Sets Out to Build China Trade,"
Christian Science Monitor
,
25 Aug 78, pp. 1, 11.
7 7 International Petroleum Encyclopedia
,
The Petroleum
Publishing Co., Tulsa, OK, 1977, p. 206.
7 8 China Oil Production Prospects, loc. cit.
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Even if Japan does import 42 million tons of crude from China
in 1990, that figure provides for only 5 to 6 percent of Japan's
total energy requirement projections for that year. Japan must
look elsewhere.
B. INDONESIA AS AN OIL SOURCE
About twelve percent of Japan's total oil supply for 1976
comes from Indonesia. (See 128 Appendix.) The future of con-
tinued supplies of Indonesian oil is in doubt, however, because
new production is simply not being developed, and the older wells
are being drained. Japan has had to deal with the following
economic realities in Indonesia.
The Indonesian national oil company, Pertamina, under the
direction of army General Ibnu Sutowo, managed to lose more
than $10 billion on loans for projects which were completely
unrelated to oil. Pertamina dabbled in airplanes, ships,
hotels, office buildings and other projects, but so mismanaged
its accounts that the company actually lost money at a time
when oil resources virtually guaranteed economic success.
Prior to 1976, the oil that was being produced in Indonesia
was distributed as follows:
Original contracts provided for a recovery of
investments by operators from the first 40°j
of production. About 20$ of production was
turned over to refineries operated by the
state-owned Pertamina at 20<t/bbl above cost
of production. The remainder was split 65-55
(sometimes higher) in favor of Pertamina, with
the government imposing an 'excess profits tax'
on operator sales. 79
79 International Petroleum Encyclopedia 7, op. cit., p. 32
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In an attempt to recover from the catastrophic financial
losses it suffered in 1975, the sinking Pertamina drew up new
contracts with the various oil producers. The new contracts,
in effect give the government 88-89% of all foreign oil pro-
duction within Indonesia.
The new contract system was expected to net
Indonesia an additional income of about
$350 million per year. But the net result
was suspension of exploration drilling by non-
producing operators as well as producers. u
Indonesian oil and gas resources are considerable, presently
estimated to be at about 10 billion barrels of oil and 24
trillion cu . ft. of gas. Indonesia profits by its trade with
Japan. The tragedy is that the Indonesian government and
company management are so infested with graftprone executives
that a net profit cannot seem to be turned. Aside from super-
fluous judgments on the relative morality or immorality of
Indonesian corruption, the fact is that new exploration and
new wells are not being financed because sufficient investment
incentives have not been provided.
...Indonesia's oil industry is sick and the
disease is affecting all of Asia. Authori-
tative sources say at least two confidential
oil industry surveys and a study of U.S.
economic experts indicate that Indonesia may
cease to be a significant exporter of oil
far sooner than had been expected. The
nation, now the ninth-ranked producer among
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting





George McArthur, "Future of Indonesia's Industry Called
Bleak," Monterey Peninsula Herald, 8 Apr 78, p. 11.
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Since the contracts were renegotiated, exploration has
been limited to known areas where infrastructure surveys are
available and successful wells are a virtual certainty.
Drilling is an extremely expensive investment, and when the
profit margin is critically small, the risks must also be
small
.
The combined effects of the large government royalties on
oil production, the growing trends toward nationalism and
resource protectionism, and the problem of corruption and
"speed money" all contributed to a stifling of foreign in-
vestments in Indonesia.
Total foreign investments plummeted from
almost US$ 2000 million in 1975 to U3$ 245
million in 1976, and through August 1977
remained at a mere US$ 197 million- -with
most of this additional capital for invest-
ment in existing projects rather than new
ones . °
-
In August of 1977 the government set out on a new anti-
corruption campaign, chiefly designed to reduce shipping
delays in the harbors by customs personnel. By forbidding
the use of "speed money" in the bureaucracy, the government
succeeded only in creating longer tie-ups and more delays
than before.
Japanese involvement in the Indonesian economy has been
extensive in the past. Significant new production for
Japanese energy requirements can be found in the US$ "00
million Badak liquid natural gas (LNGj facility in East
Kalimantan. The Badak LNG facility should add substantially




to Japan's gas supplies, but its rate of production will
depend upon the quantities of natural gas that are actually
taken from the wells
.
Natural gas seems to be the new focus of Indonesia's
energy development plans. The Arun gas field in northern
Sumatra constitutes Southeast Asia's largest known reservoir
of natural gas and condensate. It is the scene of some major
development efforts
.
Mobil Oil Indonesia, which operates the Arun
field under a production sharing contract with
Pertamina, is spending US$ 400-500 million to
bring the gas to the surface. At Lhokseumawe,
20 miles away on the Straits of Malacca, work
is nearing completion on a US$ 920 million LNG
plant and storage ins tallation . 8
3
Japanese financing for the major portion of the Sumatran
development projects comes from three Japanese government
agencies: the Import-Export Bank, the Overseas Economic
Cooperation Fund, and the Japanese International Cooperation
Agency. The hope is that Indonesian LNG can be supplied to
Japan through long-term, development- supply contracts on a
stable, consistent schedule.
Even in the face of these large, government-backed
investments in Sumatra and Kalimantan, the likelihood of
Indonesia becoming the chief supplier of energy to Japan is not
on the increase, her oil production is not expanding. More-
over, projected production capacities are still not suffi-
ciently large to alter Japan's dependency on OAPEC
.
8 3David Jenkins, "Indonesian's Challenging New Frontier,"
Far Eastern Economic Review
,
4 Aug 78, p. 36.
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C. THE SOVIETS AS AN OIL SOURCE
During the past year, two conflicting views of Soviet oil
prospects have emerged, one mildly optimistic and the other
wildly pessimistic. The validity of either view depends upon
which set of assumptions one will accept, at which point the
arguments become extremely complex. The pessimist view, in
the words of a CIA study for the Congressional Joint Economic
Committee, is based on the following analysis.
The Soviet economy has grown very rapidly during the past
twenty years. Russia has made a maximum effort to (1) equal
the United States militarily, (2) expand its industrial base
and (3) respond to internal rising expectations and consumer
demand for improved standards of living. The rate of growth,
however, seems to be slowing. Labor is in short supply;
margins of capital productivity are diminishing; harsher
weather-pattern .trends may reduce future agricultural output;
only limited exchange reserves are available to purchase
additional, necessary technology; the economy also faces
84
sharp costs increases for the retrieval of natural resources.
The more readily accessible fuel and mineral
reserves west of the Urals are being rapidly
depleted, while the abundant but more remote
resources of Siberia and Central Asia require
enormous investment outlays ... Soviet explora-
tion and extraction policy has long favored
increasing current output over developing
sources of future output. As a result, new
oil deposits have not been discovered rapidly
enough to offset inevitable declines in older
fields . 85
84 U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Soviet Economic
Problems and Prospects
,
Studv, 8 Aug 77, USGPO , Washington, DC",
ly/1 /, pp. v-vi.
— 6
85 Ibid.
, pp. VI-VII .
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The study does acknowledge the presence of extensive
oil deposits, coal, natural gas, and hydroelectric potential
to the east of the Ural Mountains. The problems with such
resources, however, are that (1) they are located a great
distance away from the centers of population and industry,
and (2) their development will require massive capital in-
vestments and several years' lead time. The Soviets appar-
ently do not have the necessary surplus capital to develop
their resources to the extent they would like, nor have they
been able to attract sufficient foreign capital thus far.
Soviet negotiations with the Japanese could easily have
resulted in extensive development of oil and gas resources
in the Far East. Due to an apparent Soviet uncertainty over
how much oil they could afford to lose to the Japanese,
severe modifications were made to the initial contract esti-
mates, and the Japanese balked. Concerning this, Professor
Wu writes, "One gains the impression that in pressing the
Japanese for additional concessions on the terms of the
loan and the magnitude of the credit, or in introducing the
Baikal Amur railway proposal, the Russians overplayed their
q f.
hand unnecessarily." The problem ma/ have been sociological
The Soviet attitude toward foreign trade is
somewhat different from the customary view
in a market economy ... Ideally they would
like not to have to trade at all, since not
only is economic independence regarded as a




, p . 59
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kind of activity for the command economy
to plan and administer effectively. '
Whatever the precise motivation may have been, the
Soviet Union has not taken full advantage of its vast nature
resources. Given the economic pressures that the Soviets
must anticipate in the near and long term, their polities
as we perceive them seem likely to result in ever- increas ing
competition and possible conflict with the Western world
over the available oil supplies.
The Director of the Federal Energy Administration for
International Energy Affairs, Mr. Melvin Conant, gave the
following testimony at a Congressional hearing last year.
...Over this next decade, we emphasize that
competition for access to Middle East oil
hold a very great potential for divisiveness
between the United States, Europe, and Japan...
We sugges t . . . that there is a probability that
the Soviet Union may also, if to a comparatively
minor degree, find itself competing for this
oil, and it will be the first time in history
that the Soviet Union, Japan, Europe, and
the United States will be in such a race.^8
This whole outlook was decidedly so gloomy that it
provoked a reassessment effort. The Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence did some further investigating in 197S, and
came to the conclusion that the CIA had channeled its pre-
dictions along a "worst case" scenario progression. Few,
Robert W. Campbell, The Economics of Soviet Oil and Gas ,







U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs , Political and Economic Factors Governing Access to Energy






if any analysts really expect the worst case to actually
occur
.
The CIA, in its report of April 1977,
indicated supply from Middle East countries
could begin to fall short of demand from
free world and Communist countries as early
as 1982-1983. That was expected to trigger
a burst of higher prices, and usher in a
period when the Soviets became major com-
petitors for oil... That seems less likely
today. The Soviets will take every possi-
ble step to conserve oil, and to continue
as net exporters into the 1980 's, the
Senate study indicates. This could lessen
pressure on supplies, and maintain stable,




Much less credibility has been given in recent months to
last year's speculation that the Soviets would soon be im-
porting oil to meet their energy requirements. Naturally,
the Soviets themselves tend to minimize that likelihood in
their own public s ta tements
-
-but the strength of their opti-
mism is physically manifested too. Only 20 to 25 of Western
Siberia's 150 known oil and gas fields have been developed.
Potential yields are enormous.
To back up the ambitious development
schedules, $53 billion will be invested
in the Tyumen region during the 1976-1930
period, according to Yuri Rogachev, deputy
chairman of the region's executive com-
mittee. The figure is nearly 2.5 times qq
what was spent on the region in 1970-1975.
What has been the Japanese experience with regard to its
Soviet oil possibilities? Not surprisingly, the Japanese
89 John Dillon, "Soviet Demand for World Oil Minimized," CSM,
23 May 78, p. 3.
90
Dan Fisher, "Soviet Union's Oil-Gas Resources are Staggering,"
Monterey Peninsula Herald
,
12 Feb 73, p. 5B.
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have been considering the joint development of Soviet oil
and gas resources for at least a decade. In June 1967 the
first meeting of the Japan-Soviet Economic Committee took up
a Soviet proposal to develop oil resources in the Tyumen
fields. The committee also considered a Yakutsk Natural Gas
project at a later meeting in February, 1968. The Sakhalin
oil and gas project was first proposed in February of 1972.
According to Professor Wu of the Hoover Institute, these
three projects, as they were all being considered in the fall
of 1972, were to require a total credit of only $4 billion
from the Export- Import Bank of Japan. The Tyumen project
initially involved the construction of a 4,500 km pipeline to
the port of Nakhodka for 51 billion. For another $2 or $3
billion, the Yakutsk Natural Gas project involved both a
pipeline and an LNG plant at Nakhodka. That plant would
facilitate LNG exports to Japan or the U.S. Sakhalin, because
of its convenient location, would only need a $230 million in-
vestment .
One of the contested issues in the negotiation
concerned the rate of interests: the Japanese
were asking for 6.5 percent while the Soviet
side proposed a rate of 6 percent in addition
to a four-year deferment of payment. ^1
Delay followed delay. By August of 1973, the Soviets
returned to the tables with requests for larger loans, but
91 Wu, op. cit., p. 41.

holding less incentive for Japanese investors. The Japanese
had been lead to believe that if Tyumen oil production could
reach 125 million tons/yr by 1975 and 230 million tons/yr by
1980, then the Soviet export of Tyumen oil to Japan would also
rise from 25 to 40 million tons/yr in direct proportion to
increases in production. The Soviets put the cap at 25
million tons/yr, even at peak production; the three projects
would cost the Japanese an initial outlay of $5.6 billion.
What was more, the Soviets wanted to use rail transport
instead of a pipeline.
The harder negotiating posture on the part of the Soviets
may simply have been the result of a reassessment of the Tyumen
potential and Soviet domestic oil requirements. Possibly the
Soviets were only stalling in anticipation of the Arab-Israeli
War and OPEC embargo- - feeling that the Japanese position would
inevitably weaken.
The Japanese needed better security on such an investment
in any case, and the political ramifications of building rail
lines so close to the Chinese border would require some U.S.
political reassurances. U.S. involvement through U.S. invest-
ment in these projects would offset Russia's leverage over the
Japanese in further contract disputes or negotiations.
In March of 1974, when the prospect of U.S. involvement
was introduced, the U.S. Congress was quite deeply involved in
the question over linkages between enhanced trade relations
with the Soviets and the free emigration of Russian Jews.
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No U.S. Export- Import Bank credits materialized; no relaxa-
tion of the Soviet offer became public; the Tyumen project
was shelved- -and remains shelved thus far. The Yakutsk
Natural Gas project was also shelved for lack of joint U.S.
financing. The Sakhalin project, although more successful,
has also run aground of the Japan-Soviet dispute over the
status of the "northern territories," the Habomai Island
group, Shikotan, Etorofu, and Kunashiri
.
Both Japan and the USSR could realize significant advan-
tages by cooperating on the development of Siberian resources.
The Japanese, on the one hand, may have the opportunity to
tap into one of the world's greatest energy reservoirs.
A survey shows that the USSR by Jan. 1, 1977,
had discovered at least 49 giant gas fields,
each with proved-plus-probable reserves of
3.5 trillion cu . ft. or more. Of these, more
than 30 are not yet in production . '
'
For a nation so desperately dependent on imported oil as
is Japan, the availability of such a store of energy is cer-
tainly a hope for the future. Secondly, the proximity of
Siberian energy is also important to Japan. Presently,
Japan's energy lifeline extends through the shallow waters of
the South China Sea and the Malacca Straits all the way to
the Persian Gulf. The costs of shipping, the opportunities
for interdiction or interference, territorial waters disputes,
and Middle Eastern instability have all been seen to be
9 2 International Petroleum Encyclopedia 1977, op. cit., p. 216
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detrimental to Japan's energy interests. If large quantities
of oil could be had at an east Siberian port--some uncertain-
ties and disadvantages could be removed. Third, and most
important, Japan is located in the midst of two very large
and powerful communist states, with whom she must coexist.
The communist satellites, notably North Korea, Vietnam and
Cambodia, are all capable of irrational or aggressive be-
havior- -and Japan is unable to project her small defense
forces over the long, vulnerable lifeline coming from the
Middle East. The United States provides some balance to
the potential military threats which Japan faces. The U.S.-
Japan Mutual Security Treaty has served both countries well
for nearly 20 years. With respect to the major Asian powers,
it is possible and even likely that the Sino-Soviet rift has
provided Japan an additional degree of security against
communist adverturism in Asia. To the extent that this is
true, Japan musr try to avoid siding or aligning with either
of the two major communist powers, and maintain a neutral
position with regard to Sino-Soviet disputes. Japan has had
only limited success in her recent discussions with the
Soviets, and it is in Japan's interests to improve relations
with Russia- -especially in light of Japan's recent peace
and Friendship Treaty with China. The balance must be
maintained
.
The USSR's advantage in such joint development projects
as have been discussed thus far, stem largely from the added
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national benefits of enhanced resource availability. When
the pipelines or railroads are built, these "tools" only
add to the overall productivity of the Soviet Union. Second,
strategic advantages are realized by (1) a major refueling
terminal becoming available on the eastern coast, (2)
enhanced troop mobility (by rail), and (3) extension of
significantly more Soviet influence and control over its
eastern affairs. Third, Japanese and American technology
would become available as the projects were planned and
built, providing a possible template for even further Soviet
development in other regions. Fourth, the Soviets would gain
a political advantage with respect to Japan, China, and in
world opinion. Japan's dependency, and her economic align-
ment, would slap at China. Development of such huge energy
resources is a very impressive undertaking in today's world.
Soviet disadvantages are more subtle. By allowing
Japanese and, possibly, US technicians into the country, the
possibility of an information leak is increased. Russia
treasures her secrets, and this may worry them a great deal.
Also, oil is a finite resource, and it would seem better to
minimize its outflow and keep it for domestic use. However,
if the fields are not developed, and oil eventually has to be
imported, the resultant outflow of exchange capital would
severely limit Russia's ability to pay for the kinds of
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technology she needs to raise her low productivity to Western
levels
.
Russia is determined to maximize gas exports
even if it requires, as expected, smaller gains
in domestic consumption and a switch to alter-
nate fuels by Soviet industry. This is a policy
already being followed with respect to oil
exports . y J
Japan knows that it must maintain reasonable good relations
with the Soviets. Whether she decides to go ahead with her
plans to work with the USSR on Siberian developments will
depend upon her assessment of political vs. economic costs and
benefits. The Middle East is an unstable oil vendor, but
would the Soviets provide a much more stable supply? Will the
pending Peace and Friendship Treaty with China require that
some countervailing concessions be made to the Soviets? Will
the Japanese accept lower interest rates from the Russians
as "partial payment" for their treaty with the Chinese? If
the treaty is signed, the Japanese will most assuredly be
looking for ways to reassure the Soviets that the anti-hegemony
clause (included at Chinese insistence) has little significance
for Japanese -Soviet relations. An economic concession may,
indeed, provide such a reassurance.
D. VENEZUELA AS AN OIL SOURCE
Japan is one of Venezuela's least important accounts". In
all of 1976, Japan imported only- 300,000 metric tons of crude
93 Ibid, p. 215.
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oil from Venezuela, down from 387,000 mt in 1974. That
amounts to little more than a thousandth of Japan's total
annual oil requirement. The Japanese market receives about
.82- percent of Venezuela's oil exports. In contrast, the
United States and Canada combine to receive 6 9 percent.
The vast majority of the remaining 30 percent is sold in
Europe. Japan has had only limited success in diversifying
her oil sources through Latin America.
Since the early part of this century, Venezuela has been
the second largest producer of oil in the western hemisphere.
A member of OPEC, Venezuela did not participate in the Arab
oil embargo of 1973, and continued to supply oil to the
United States and the Netherlands. The situation has changed
in Venezuela since that time, however.
Production has steadily fallen off, partly due to a slow
depletion of her older wells, and partly due to a worldwide
oil surplus which has remained in effect since the end of the
oil embargo in 1974. Higher oil prices have cushioned the
impact, but the future is somewhat uncertain. The oil surpiu:
is rapidlv becoming an oil glut.
After a heady two-year era of soaring oil
profits, Venezuela is facing the prospect of
some economically lean years ahead. In large
measure, the current world oil glut is to
blame- -an unexpected factor that has forced
Venezuela to significantly reduce oil pro-
duction ... Production this year will hover at
1.7 million barrels daily, a 27.5 percent
drop from the 1977 figure of 2.35 million.
94 James Nelson Goodsell, "Oil Profit Plunge Heats Up
Election in Venezuela," Christian Science Monitor, 51 May ~S
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A second major change in the Venezuelan oil industry
took place January 1, 1976, when Venezuela nationalized oil
operations throughout the country, expropriating private
holdings connected with oil production and refining.
During that year she announced an ambitious 5-year plan
designed to expand her oil industry to even higher levels
of activity, exploration, development, and production. A
government-owned holding company, Petroven, was established
Its function was to oversee the operations of 14 subsidiary
companies acting under its direct control.
Concerning the terms of the nationalization, several
aspects are especially significant. No private-capital
participation is allowed, neither foreign nor domestic,
within the Venezuelan oil industry. Private companies
were compensated for their lost holdings, and appeals
were allowed concerning the amount of compensation.
Private "participation" continues in a new capacity, that
being in the form of operating contracts. These contracts
bring in the necessary foreign expertise, and provide that
a fee be paid for their services.
Except that a company, by drilling a successful well,
has incrementally increased the world's oil supply, it
realizes no direct benefit from its success (and suffers
no loss from a dry hole.) Venezuela retains complete
control over the well's production and profits. Argentina
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uses a similar system- -with similar results. Production
is dropping off.
Venezuela has done some experimentation with tar sands,
a form of "unconventional" oil reserves, but the process
of extraction is still very expensive and costly, too, in
terms of energy investment for energy gained. She has
other alternatives, however.
Additional conventional reserves ... are
also a distinct possibility in relatively
unexplored areas, both onshore and off-
shore. The entire continental shelf or
the Caribbean, the delta of the Orinoco
River, and the Gulf of Venezuela are
often mentioned as prime targets for the
future .. .Activity in the Gulf of Venezuela
continues to be held back by a diplomatic
tiff between Columbia and Venezuela over
the boundary of territorial waters.... 95
Prospects for expanded Japanese involvement in the
Venezuelan oil industry would seem to hinge upon her ability
to outbid her American and Canadian competitors for either
crude or refined petroleum products. One would suspect
that American firms would have the technological comparative
advantage in securing Venezuelan contracts for oil explora-
tion and development. For Japan, Venezuelan oil is expen-
sive anyway, because of its distance from Japanese ports.
The prospects, therefore, do not seem favorable.




E. MEXICO AS AN OIL SOURCE
Where Japanese prospects for diversification are concerned,
Mexico has a lot more potential
.
Mexico is rapidly becoming a major oil producer.
In 1976, local oil output approached 1,000,000 b/d
and furthur increases planned for the next 6 years
should bring the total to over 2,200,000 b/d by
1982 , 96
Mexico's successes are recent developments. Only a few
years ago, Mexico was a desperately poor country and getting
poorer with each new wave of her ongoing population explosion.
Proper management of her oil industry, however, can attract
the necessary foreign investment, technology and industry
necessary to provide for substantial economic growth.
During 1972, in the states of Chiapas and
Tabasco, government owned Petroleos Mexicanos
(Pemex) tapped a new Creataceous oil province
that in 1975 began to raise eyebrows around
the world and sent a number of official and un-
official fact-finding missions from OPEC member
countries to court Mexico. This became the first
firm indication of a major discovery, potentially
capable of threatening the OPEC cartel. 9
"
Japan would do well to find a way to aid Mexico in its
efforts to achieve a higher standard of living. This action
would, incidentally, be of some benefit to the United States
as well; more jobs in Mexico would reduce the demographic
pressures of "illegals" looking for work in America. Japan
must realize that Mexico is a potential goldmine.
Crude exports, to average 150,000 b/d in 19"",








1977, bringing the total to 400,000 b/d by
1982. By then, Pemex expects to have a
surplus of 700,000 b/d of refined oroducts
q q
available for export. °
Presently, Mexico has no Pacific terminal for crude export
upload. Refined products are piped to Salina Cruz, a small
Pacific terminal, from the refining centers at Coatzacoalcos
.
However, the major share of Mexico's petroleum exports depart
from Tampico, Tuxpan, Veracruz, and Coatzacoalcos, all of
which are located on the Gulf of Mexico.
For Japan, that fact means oil must either transit the
Panama Canal in undersized tankers, or continue eastward
around the southern tip of Africa, through the Lombok Straits,
and north again to Japan. For the time being, neither of
these options is economically practical. If a Pacific termi-
nal, capable of berthing supertankers for crude uploads, is
ever made available by Mexico, Japan will certainly jump at
the chance to be first in line.
Ibid
. , p . 1 j4
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IV. ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SOLUTIONS
It is unreasonable to expect that the supply of oil will
continue to expand in similar proportions ad infinitum.
Japan's economy in 1978 is still growing at a rate considerably
in excess of 6 percent per year, and has even threatened to
exceed ten percent. Consequently, the ACE projections for
1985 energy demand levels will soon be void of meaning. Unless
Japan's economic growth is curtailed in the energy- intens ive
sectors, her energy requirements will not be reduced. A quick
look at the statistics (Appendix) will point out Japan's
failure to diversify her oil sources.
Therefore, a major policy goal for Japanese planners must
be concerned with the development of alternative sources of
energy. In the past, the only sources of energy which had
been able to respond to large increases in demand were coal
and, later, oil. Japan's fragile eco-system will no longer
tolerate the extensive coal-burning which was so prevalent
prior to and during World War II. Oil is the only major
fuel in Japan today. However, oil production no longer can
expand so quickly, or so immediately, in response to ever-
increasing world demand. Exploration and advanced recovery
technology involves massive capital investments and longer
production lag times. Because of its expense, and uncertain
future, oil has lost much of its appeal as a long-term energy
source. The new rationale is simply this. As long as massive
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investments are inevitable, why not channel them into an
energy source with a future?
The following section of this thesis will examine sources
of energy other than oil which may play a major role in re-
ducing Japan's oil dependence. While these sources do open
up new possibilities in the prognoses of future energy pro-
duction levels, the ultimate observation is that they are
simply not sufficiently developed to provide the quantities
of power which will be required over the next two decades.
Barring a major technological breakthrough in energy pro-
duction, the environmental risks and initial investments




The Japanese people have a deep-seated abhorrence for
nuclear energy. Government programs in Japan, designed to
develop and incorporate new, nuclear energy sources of
energy have been consistently met with active resistance.
However, even in the face of its unpopularity- -nuclear




Many people believe that nuclear energy provides the
answer Japan is looked for as regards her energy question.
Using breeder reactors, Japan in theory could have a perpetual
energy source for the production of electricity. The initial
investments are extremely large, and there are environmental
costs, but an autonomous energy production capability could
be achieved for an unlimited duration.
In a 1976 government white paper on atomic energy, Japan
pointed out that her nuclear programs were not progressing
as smoothly as had been originally hoped. Popular sentiment
against any new nuclear installations was proving to be a
tremendous bottleneck. The report noted that "the biggest
task in respect to the development of A-energy was to obtain
the cooperation and the understanding of the people."
Japan established its Bureau of Atomic Energy Safety
within the Science and Technology Agency in January of 1976.
Its purpose, beyond the task of improving the safety and
screening features of Japan's reactors, was to offer some
positive input to the public sector concerning the relative
safety and desirability of nuclear development.
Japan has, essentially, no indigenous uranium deposits
of comparative value. In order for Japan's nuclear reactors
to function, outside sources of atomic fuel need to be
"White Paper on Atomic Energy," Asian Recorder , January
22-28, 1977, p. 15563.
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developed while breeder research is being conducted. In
order to do this, Japan must work out cooperative agreements
with countries possessing such resources, such as the United
States or Canada.
However, Japan is already heavily dependent upon the
United States. The U.S. provides military security forces
for the defense of Japan, and also happens to constitute
nearly a third of Japan's export market. For Japan to rely
upon United States uranium supplies for the maintenance of
her economic life-blood and well-being would only deepen
her dependency problem. Japan's inclination, therefore, is
to look elsewhere for her nuclear fuels, if possible. "Japan
has already contracted to buy a total of 145,000 metric tons
of uranium by 1985 from Australia, Canada, and South Africa,
as well as from the Congo and Niger, through France.'
Japan started nuclear power production in
'1966 and now has 13 lightwater reactors
fueled by enriched uranium, capable of
generating 7.4 million kilowatts of
electricity ... It plans to increase the
capacitv to 53 million kilowatts by
1985. . . . 101
Yuko Nakamikado, "Japan Tiptoes Ahead on Peaceful






One aspect of Japan's nuclear policy, however, greatly
concerns the Carter administration. Japan wants to reprocess
its own nuclear fuels, using technologies that would result
in weapons grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU)
being manufactured. Under the terms of U.S. uranium supply
contracts, this cannot be done without U.S. authorization.
Fearing that possession of weapon's grade fuels would
inspire a nation to join the "nuclear club," or give incen-
tive to terrorist attempts to acquire such materials for
their own purposes, the U.S. has been extremely reluctant to
authorize any such reprocessing. The alternative, for the
recipient country, is to rely upon U.S. supplies of low-
enriched uranium (LEU), which the U.S. is able to supply in
large quantities. LEU is not a weapons grade fuel. This has
been the thrust of U.S. nuclear policy for the last several
years, and it has brought the U.S. and Japan into direc-
disagreement over the status of Japan's S 2 million Tokai-
mura reprocessing plant. Located 60 miles northeast of
Tokyo, the plant would have cut Japan's nuclear fuels
dependency significantly. Spent fuels in Japan's reactors
could be reprocessed in Japan, and used again to generate
even more power. The reprocessing techniques, however,
result in plutonium byproducts. Plutonium is a basic
ingredient in the manufacture of nuclear weapons.
Faced with U.S. resistance to her reprocessing program
coupled with intense domestic restiveness over the issue,
Japan took up another course.
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Japan has told the United States it will
spend more than $1 billion to finance
plutonium reprocessing plants in France
and Great Britain, thus ending any (US)
hope that Japanese will not use plutonium
as a nuclear fuel. The Japanese plan
comes as a hard blow to the Carter admin-
istration, which earlier this year asked
Japan to forego any plutonium reprocessing
plans for at least two years .. .Japan
insists it cannot count on fueling...
(their reactors) with enriched uranium
and thus needs to power them with plu-
tonium. 10" (parenthesis added)
Japan plans to sign long-term supply contracts with France
and Great Britain wherein these two countries would reprocess
Japan's spent nuclear fuels, extract the plutonium, and ship
the plutonium back to Japan. Japan's billion dollar invest-
ment will serve as a sort of prepayment device. In time,
France and Britain will "buy out" Japan's share of the invest-
ment by supplying her with reprocessed plutonium. This
course of action was considered to be more expedient for the
Japanese, as Japan's environmental, safety and land utiliza-
tion constraints would have slowed her own reprocessing capa-
bilities to an impossible pace. Moreover, the United States
was applying pressure to scrap her entire reprocessing
program.
The British plant at Windscale will be capable of repro-
cessing 1600 tons of spent fuel per year. The French plant,
already in place at LeHavre, will be expanded from a rated
capacity of 400 tons per year to 1600 tons per year. °
^
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Each reactor that produces 1000 megawatts
of electric power requires about 5,500
tons of uranium (in the form of uranium
oxide) to operate during an expected 30-
year life span. 104
Apparently then, the British and French reprocessing
facilities would each be able to completely service the
spent fuel coming from nine, 1000 megawatt generators.
Obviously, Japan's reactors will take some priority over
most of the world's 200 or so nuclear facilities. Japan
has 13 reactors in operation, and 13 more in various stages
of planning of construction. Brazil recently acquired a
reprocessing plant through West Germany, and Pakistan may
yet receive one through France. Pressure from the United
States, however, has succeeded in restricting further
sales of such technology to "non-nuclear" nations. The
free world's nuclear fuel consumers will, barring a major
technological breakthrough, be forced to rely on one or
more of the world's three major uranium sources, the U.S.,
Canada, and/or Australia.
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During his very brief visit to the United States in May,
1978, Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda proposed yet another
alternative to the world's energy dilemma. Recognizing that
solving the world's energy problems will require large sums
of money, Fukuda suggested that the United States and Japan
establish a joint fund to carry out research and development
in science and technology.
Japanese Foreign Ministry officials expanded upon Fukuda '
s
statement, saying that such a fund might range anywhere from
$50 million to $1 billion. Each nation would contribute half.
Fukuda singled out nuclear fusion and solar
energy as 'particularly useful areas for joint
research and development' but also suggested
development of nuclear fuel cycle technology
that by itself would provide guarantees
against proliferation of nuclear weapons and
research to improve the_ safety and reliability
of nuclear reactors. 1-05
Solar power does have a tremendous appeal for a number of
reasons. The supply is inexhaustible, though perhaps inter-
mittent in direct application. It leaves no waste product
and is, therefore, non-polluting. It would be very difficult
to embargo such a commodity, or restrict access. The poten-
tial for economic growth, given a dependable energy source
such as solar power, would be very great indeed.
"Fukuda Makes Proposal for Research Fund," Monterey
Peninsula Herald, 5 May 78, p. 9.
74

Solar energy can be collected in solar panels which are
filled with a circulating liquid. The heat is drawn off and
put to use. A second, and potentially more significant
collector of solar energy is the photovoltaic cell.
The photovoltaic cell, when exposed to photon pressures,
develops an electric current. If the cells can be made to
work more efficiently, and if enough of them can be gathered
together and exposed to sunlight, an extremely valuable energy
source would be realized.
The disadvantages to either system stem from the fact
that the sun is only intermittently in the sky, and weather
systems can obscure it for long periods of time. Second,
the costs of initial investments in solar energy are too
high to warrant their purchase for the time being- -oil still
being a relatively inexpensive commodity by comparison.
However, in the United States, the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration is developing a plan to orbit a
series of 20 "solar collector" satellites, each equipped
with photovoltaic cells, and capable of converting solar
electricity into microwave energy. The microwaves would be
beamed toward specific receivers on earth, converted back
into electricity, and distributed through existing power
networks. In this way, the problems of intermittent sun-
light and clouds would be overcome. Valuable land would
not have to be sacrificed to massive collector facilities,
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and no pollution would result. These advantages make solar
energy especially appealing to the Japanese.
Although such a satellite would be cheap
to operate, it would take more than a
billion dollars to launch one experimen-
tally. No federal money is currently
budgeted for this, but 25 million dollars
is proposed for next year. 106
The joint fund proposed by Prime Minister Fukuda could go
a long way toward reducing the costs of research and experi-
mental development of solar satellites. Joint successes in
this field would bring a great deal of prestige and world
esteem to the joint venture, and Japan's self-image as an
important, contributing world actor would be enhanced. If
important progress is made in photovoltaic research, Japan
may even be willing to contribute more than her 50% share
of the expenses in order to bring the project to fruition.
Further optimism for the world's future energy situa-
tion can be justified through recent developments in the
efficiency ratings of the photovoltaic cells. U.S. scientists,
using a "thin' film" solar cell, have demonstrated a 9.15";
light- to- electricity power conversion, and expect to achieve
10 percent efficiencies by the end of 1978. Costs, the chief





obstacle to widespread use, amounted to $50 per watt as
recently as two years ago. At this writing, the cells can be
had for $6 per watt, and through mass production techniques
could cost as little as 25 cents per watt by 1982. At that
price, solar electricity will constitute a viable option when
compared to the world's diminishing fossil fuels.
C. GEOTHERMAL ENERGY
What other energy options might Japan pursue? One neglected
possibility is that of increased utilization of geothermal
energy. The volcanic islands of Japan literally thrust them-
selves out of the sea many millions of years ago. Japan's
mountainous topography still includes about 50 volcanos which
are yet active to some degree. Properly harnessed, the hot
magma which flows somewhere beneath her islands would theoret-
ically become one of Japan's most valuable natural energy resources
Former Interior Secretary Rogers Morton placed
geothermal power in its proper perspective when
he stated: 'In this time of critically high
energy requirements, the various fuels are not
alternatives to each other. We need them all,
including geothermal.-'-'^
Japan presently has four geothermal installations, pro-
ducing a total of 50 megawatts, which is only a very
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tiny contribution to Japan's total energy requirements.
The potential for growth in this field is very large.
The Russians have already developed some of their
geothermal potential, and Iceland, too, is building a
55 megawatt geothermal plant. Steam reservoirs at
Lardarello, Italy, are generating nearly 400 megawatts.
New Zealand is producing 170 megawatts from a part of
its geothermal potential. Mexico developed 75 megawatts.
El Salvadore invested $44 million in her 50 megawatt
geothermal plant, and is now saving $5 million per year
in imported oil. The point is that Japan could take
advantage of its own geothermal potential to a greater
extent
.
Part of Japan's problem as it relates to geothermal
development is environmental. The vast majority of Japan's
geothermal outlets, hot springs, and volcanic activity,
are located within national parts or refuges. In order
for these areas to be developed, staunch conservationist
factions will have to be overruled, an action which could
be politically dangerous to the ruling party. Geothermal
energy sources could account for one percent of Japan's
total energy requirement if conservationist objections
could be circumvented.
MITI, in their "Case B" projection for 1990, conceived
a possible 60-fold increase over present geothermal output





that, given the choice between economic survival and environ-
mental conservation, Japan will choose to survive.
D. OCEAN ENERGY RESOURCES
In other energy realms, Japan may see some potential in
growing and harvesting seaweed, or kelp, so that it can later
be converted into methane gas by bacterial digestion.
A 1974 Federal Administration Study set $4.20
per million British thermal units (Btu) on
energy (the equivalent of 1000 cubic feet of
gas) as the breakeven price for synthetic
natural gas, assuming there were no other by-
products . . .110
Unregulated, intrastate gas prices in the U.S. range from
$2.50 to $3.50 per 1000 cubic feet. By-products from the
harvested seaweed, such as fertilizer, combined with the shell-
fish and other seafood scooped up along with the seaweed,
could bring synthetic gas costs down enough to be competitive
with natural gas
.
An island nation such as Japan could set up huge kelp
farms several miles offshore. Pumps powered by wave action
could bring low-level nutrients to the surface in those
deeper waters. Seaweed is an efficient collector of solar
energy; some varieties grow as fast as two feet per day.
With proper facilities (certainly the Pacitic Ocean is
large enough) Japan could provide itself with a significant
Brad Knickerbocker, "Methane From Lowly Seaweed,"
Christian Science Monitor, 7 Sep 77, p. 6.
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percentage of its total energy requirement through syn-
thetically manufactured methane.
Two other energy resources closely tied to Japan's
maritime situation can be found in tidal power and thermal
conversion. Such energy sources are ideal for island
nations such as Japan. However, their utilization is not
widespread. "France, Russia, and China are the only
countries that now operate tidal plants. A plant is
planned by the South Koreans."
Tidal power works on a principle which takes advantage
of the moon's gravitational pull on the ocean surfaces.
Between low and high tides, huge potential energies are
sotred in the elevated sea levels. This potential energy
can be bottled up and released at low tide when the
difference in water levels is greatest. Japan's western
coast provides several such bottlenecks. Most notably,
Japan's Inland Sea seems to have the greatest potential
for such a project.
Placing dikes across the narrow entrances to the
Inland Sea, however, would entail massive investments.
Provisions would have to be made for commercial shipping.
The environmental impact probably would be significant.
Public reaction to such a project would doubtless be
vehement in its opposition, as the Inland Sea is con-
sidered something as a national treasure. Still, with
"Here's a Fresh Look at Far Out Fuels," loc. cit
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proper planning and public relations, Japan may yet find a
way to introduce pollution- free , tidal energy into her
energy program.
Another ocean-related energy source, ocean thermal
energy conversion (OTEC) , would also involve massive initial
investments. The theory seems plausible enough. The ocean
surface acts as a collector of solar energy (heat) . A
fluid, such as ammonia, cooled by the colder waters from
below, would be heated and expanded by the warmer waters
topside. The expansion would drive the generators,
yielding a limitless supply of non-polluting electrical
power. Enough electricity would be produced to run the
cold-water pumps as well, resulting in a self-contained
generating station.
Presently, two large U.S. aerospace contractors,
Lockheed and TRW, are competing to perfect their designs
for such an installation. A great deal of enthusiasm
has been generated by these projects, if little elec-
tricity. There is reason, however, to question the
efficiency of such a concept.
The temperature differences that are avail-
able between surface and deep waters in
tropical latitudes are only 34° to 44°F.
At such temperatures an ideal heat engine
would have an efficiency of 6 percent,
and in practice OTEC will not achieve
more than 2 or 3 percent efficiency. Such
a meager performance rating requires that
a plant draw in enormous amounts of sea-
water. A 100 -megawatt plant would have
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to pump through 100,000 gallons per second...
and a thin layer of marine slime on the heat
exchanger surfaces could push the energy
balance into the red... Only 1/4 millimeter of
slime would reduce the plant's performance by
60 percent. H2
It is not impossible to build a series of such installa-
tions around Japan. However, Japan's waters would not provide
wide, tropical temperature differentials. Sited in tropical
waters, security and power transmission difficulties arise.
The probability of Japan ever utilizing an OTEC system is very
small. If Japan were able to devise an OTEC system with sig-
nificantly better efficiency than either the Lockheed or the
TRW systems, she may wish to market such a product. Reduced
worldwide demand for fossil fuels works to Japan's advantage.
E. MAGNETOHYDRODYNAMICS
Another way Japan can maximize her energy resources is
to improve the efficiency of her existing facilities. In
order to produce electricity, conventional generating plants
must use some fuel, uranium, oil or coal, to heat water into
steam. The steam is passed through the blades of a turbine
generator to make electricity. Such methods result in about
30 to 40 percent conversion efficiencies.
112 William D. Metz, "Ocean Thermal Energv: The Biggest
Gamble in Solar Power," Science
,
14 Oct 77, pp. 178, 179.
^Michael Woods, "New Way to Get Electricity From Heat
Told," Monterey Peninsula Herald
,
25 Apr 78, pp. 1, 4.
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Such efficiencies leave room for improvement. Advocates of
a new technique, based on an old principle, claim that
magnetohydrodynamics (MHD) can convert heat into electricity
at efficiency levels ranging upward from 50 to 60 percent.
Eliminating the steam and turbine generator, MHD
involves only the use of superheated ionized gases, which
are called plasma, and an extremely powerful magnet. When
the plasma is channeled through the magnetic field, an
electrical flux is induced, and "electrodes placed in the
path of the plasma pick up high-voltage current directly
from the gas stream." There are no moving parts.
Another advantage to MHD, especially where Japan is
concerned, is that high sulfur coals can be burned without
fear of air pollution. Alkali "seed particles" injected
into the plasma to enhance electrical conductivity combine
with the sulfur to form new materials which are easily
filtered
.
The technology exists to put MHD into widespread use.
The Russians have designed a 500 megawatt MHD plants,
scheduled to become operational in 1983 or 1984. For
Japan, MHD remains a question of cost vs. benefit, com-
pounded by uncertainties surrounding the source of her
future fuel supplies. MHD would be of little use to






In addition to conservation measures, and its search
for alternate sources of petroleum, Japan has actively
pursued policies of diversification as a solution to her
basic energy problem. While the importance of oil cannot
be minimized here, it should also be clear that alternative
sources of energy must be developed to augment Japan's oil
supplies, and to provide a transition period during which
Japan can ultimately choose which forms of energy to
pursue .
Japan is aware of its need for a comprehensive energy
policy. The Japanese government must find a way to over-
come the conflicting interests expressed by private in-
dustry and consumer groups. Local politics have played
havoc, for example, with Japan's nuclear programs. Certain
fears, such as pertain to reactor integrity during earth-
quakes, are justifiable. On the other hand, interminable
delays in reactor installation and certification will only
intensify the energy vulnerability with which Japan must
cope .
The alternative to an integrated nation-
al energy policy- -which might come with
some unplatable political side-effects- -
would be a supply-demand balance of energy
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at a low level and slower rate of over
all economic growth. H5
Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)
provided itself with an Advisory Committee for Energy (ACE) in
an attempt to discover the possible courses Japan may follow
with respect to a comprehensive energy solution. ACE is
comprised of a broad base of energy experts, both in and out
of government, and also includes representatives from related
industries
.
After some study, ACE published a dual - scenario , energy
supply and demand forecast for the year 1985, and extrapo-
lated even further to the year 1990 (See Table IX) . These
numbers were based upon an original premise that the Japanese
economy would continue to grow at a rate approximating
6 percent per year. A second premi-se was that current energy-
saving programs would result in a 5.5 percent reduction in
overall energy requirements for 1985 (Case A). If a concerted
energy conservation program were to be instituted and carried
out, it is conceivable that Japan's energy requirement for
1985 could be reduced by 10.8 percent (Case B)
.
In order to achieve such a level of conservancy within
the Japanese economy, ACE recommended that several areas be
given concentrated attention.
Susumu Awanohara, "Energy Policy Priority or a Major
bottleneck," Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 Dec 77, p. 48
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Energy saving and reduction of dependence on
oil are obvious areas (needing emphasis).
Full development and use of domestic resources,
diversification of foreign sources of energy,
stockpiling of most essential materials, public
education to win acceptance for establishing
energy facilities- -as well as intensified
research and development to improve use of
existing sources of energy and commercialize
new ones--are also called for. It is advo-
cated, too, that Japan play a positive role
in the international dialogue between producer
and consumer countries to stabilize the world
energy market and secure supplies .^" (paren-
thesis added)
Critics within the establishment are unhappy with the ACE
projections. The main complaint, it seems, is that the fore-
casts ignore the possibility of rather severe shortages. Also,
the government statistics are said to reflect the distorted
views of politicians who wish to deal in terms of unbridled
optimism. A tenfold increase in total geothermal output in
ten years was cited as a good example of an official exaggera-
117
tion.
While labeled a "supply and demand forecast," ACE '
s
figures are more likely reflections of projected demand
patterns. The problem still remains as to where all this
energy will be obtained, and, even assuming that it does
become available, can it be afforded at tomorrow's prices?
One fact remains clear throughout. For Japan to assure





projected demand patterns for 1985-1990, she will have to
invest large sums of money. There is no avoiding this simple
fact
.
Who will pay for facilities large enough to stockpile
90 days' worth of oil to offset the impact of future supply
interruptions? Which companies will risk the uncertainties
of overseas oil development? Who will build the necessary
coal-fired power plants to supplement the slowing growth in
oil imports? Where will that coal originate? How will it be
supplied? Liquid natural gas facilities must also be financed
and built and brought on-stream. Who can afford to contract
for a nuclear reactor in the face of such widespread public
opposition and delay?
The Japanese government, if it expects to foot the bill
for many of these projects will have to sacrifice a number of
other, very popular services. Agricultural programs and
perhaps even military expenditures will have to be subordinated
to the priorities of energy development.
The government cannot be decisive on this issue and remain
popular, too. Too many interests will be affected. For the
good of Japan in the long-term, the government will have to
shrug off the lobbyists.
The concentration of power could go far beyond
what most Japanese now envisage, with the
Government conceivably taking a tough position
on land acquisition for plants or transport
facilities, on energy saving requirements or
even in energy- related foreign policy all in






Sustaining Japan's economic growth will be complicated
further by three limiting factors: rising costs for resources
and raw materials, a continuing labor shortage, and environ-
mental constraints on certain kinds of production. The
increased costs for production that each of these constraints
will entail will also fuel another problem- -inflation
.
In response to such limits to sustained growth, Japan
may choose to follow one or more of the following policy
goals .
First, the diversification of resource supplies must be
sought. Japan has made a valiant attempt to reduce her
dependence on Middle Eastern oil, for example. Though she
has failed in this attempt, her efforts have tended to
preclude her falling into even greater dependency. As for
non-fuel resources, cooperative development projects have
been negotiated in various countries, especially with the
members of ASEAN. Through cooperative development, Japan's
supply of raw materials becomes more assured and predictable.
Major resource development will still have
top priority for investment, including oil,
natural gas, timber and bauxite. Efforts
in the early 1970's to enter small-scale
industries such as textiles, agriculture,
food processing, electrical appliances and
pharmaceuticals will be downplayed ... Maj or
emphasis will be placed on "processing
industries" such as aluminum smelters, steel
plants, lumber mills, and oil refineries...
As this coincides with increasing demands
119Saburo Okita, "Natural Resource Dependency and Japanese
Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs
,
July 1974, pp. ' 720-722.
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in Japan for pollution control, Japanese
investor and government- led consortiums
are likely to favor such investments.1 "
Second, Japan must also place a much larger emphasis
on the importation of finished goods as opposed to raw
materials. The advantage to this is threefold. If Indonesia,
for example, were to mine its own bauxite, and use its own
oil resources to process it into aluminum, by purchasing that
aluminum Japan would eliminate her requirement for oil imports
to that fractional extent. To that same extent, Japan's
tankers would be free to carry fuel for other, more critical
applications. Also, the burning of that oil, and the waste
products released from the production of aluminum, would have
added incrementally to Japan's already serious environmental
problems. By buying processed aluminum from Indonesia, Japan
is able to export some of her pollution problems away. In
addition, by allowing other countries to participate in the
finishing process, scarce Japanese labor reserves are made
available for more productive tasks. Japan will also derive
a larger advantage in exporting, through foreign investment,
of her heaw industries.
Japan must shift, or modify her domestic industries along
new modes of operation which are more energy conservative
.
By promoting growth in energy- intens ive industries, such as
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computers, micro-processors, precision parts, communications
systems, and applications research involving high technology,
Japan can save on its consumption of oil to a substantial
degree. Naturally, such shifts will be costly. Some of the
costs may be absorbed through natural depreciation on dated
facilities which would simply not be replaced. Japan's goal,
however, would be to find industries in which the contribution
of raw materials to the cost of the finished product is
minimal
.
A fourth policy goal must be to encourage the Japanese
people to find ways to save, conserve, and fully utilize
their resources. This would involve changing the lifestyles
of about 115 million people, and much will have to depend
upon the style of leadership employed. Renewed emphasis on
mass transportation, as opposed to the private auto, lowered
thermostats, durable consumer goods as opposed to throwaway
items, and recycling programs will also contribute to a
reduced, domestic demand for energy.
Fifth, within practical limits, a conceivable goal might
be to apply certain kinds of brakes to Japan's economic
growth. Between the years 1968 to 1975, Japan's GNP grew
at an average rate of ten percent per year. Her imports of
oil and oil products during the same period, however, grew
121
at the rate of 16.4 percent per year.
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V. OIL REMAINS PARAMOUNT
Interesting as nuclear, solar, geothermal and tidal energy
sources may be, one does not have to read very far into Japan's
own energy forecasts to ascertain the hard reality of her oil
dependence. Even wildly optimistic projections for 1990 see
Japan as needing 452 million kilolitres of imported oil and
gas, up from the 286 Mkl imported in 1975. Japan is not alone
in her oil dependence. Her plight is shared by the United
States and the rest of the industrialized world.
...I would like to emphasize that it is vir-
tually impossible for even the U.S. to become
energy independent before the turn of the
century. This is not to imply that our stra-
tegic vulnerability could not be drastically
reduced ... rather it is merely to emphasize
that... oil will remain the dominant fuel for
the industrialized world for the rest of the
century . L —-
Recognizing this, and recognizing that the United States
has been and probably will remain unable to formulate a
viable solution to such oil dependence, Japan has gone her
own way, What are her options?
...The Europeans and Japanese ... have little
choice but to continue to expand the nuclear
sectors of their economies and to attempt to
the degree possible to diversify the source
of their fossil fuel imports. But they will
remain crucially dependent on the Middle
East .123
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A. HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL COOPERATION
U.S. and Japanese foreign policy objectives seem to vary
widely on the matter of how to deal with the energy crisis in
general, and the OPEC oil cartel in particular. Both the U.S.
and Japanese approaches are rational, progressive forms of
international conduct, but are basically different in concept.
Neither approach is reactionary, attempting to restore an
older or previous status quo. Both accept the fact of growing
interdependence among nations in a rapidly changing world.
By viewing the OPEC oil cartel as a horizontal cooperative
among producers having similar interests, the U.S. approach
would endorse a parallel collective, a consumer's organization,
to preserve economic stability. Vertical cooperation between
the two horizontal groupings could then be accomplished in a
balanced and mutually equitable manner. Competition within
each horizontal grouping is offset by increased cooperation.
However, competition and confrontation would be more likely
between opposing organizations on the vertical plane. The
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
was the offspring of this perception.
'Inevitably the American position,' as (Under-
Secretary of State) Casey put it, ' requires
that consumer countries intensify consultation
among themselves and with producer nations on
their policies and avoid misunderstandings of
each other's positions which could lead to a
competitive struggle for exclusive arrange-
ments. '124
19/1
Szyliowicz, op. cit., p. 151
92

TABLE II - HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL COOPERATION
^ S ^ <<v















The Japanese, and also the French, did not see the U.S.
approach as being an effective instrument with which to
deal with the oil producers. Instead, Japan saw the primary
axis for cooperation as being vertical. This approach seemed
to have some real advantages: (1) Bilateral relations between
consumer and producer can be conducted without regard to third
parties in either grouping, greatly simplifying national poli-
cy decisions, (2) National interests are not held subordinate
to collective authorities of dubious motivation. How much
should Japan be expected to sacrifice for the perpetuation
of U.S. oil interests, U.S. Economic hegemony, or Israeli
intransigence? (3) Multilateral confrontation is not a factor
in vertical relations. Moreover, confrontation between con-
sumers is not inevitable.
Japanese activities during the oil embargo of 1973-74 bear
out this attitude. Government-to-government agreements, oil
contracts and credit extensions at that time evidenced Japan's
decision to break with U.S. policies and "go vertical" in her
efforts to guarantee a sufficient and continuous oil supply
in the future. Over three billion dollars worth of Japanese
credit and technological aid were pledged in those short
months. As a result, the pumps were opened once again to
Japanese tankers, and the oil flowed in greater quantities
than ever before.
Though considerably out of step, Japan did not find itself
at odds with U.S. national interests. U . S . -Japanese cooperation
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and trade remained as positive functions of the national
interests of each partner- -and were not linked to the
vagaries of some larger, collective interest of oil con-
sumerism in general.
Four years after the OPEC oil embargo, Japan is still
seeking to maintain its position as a major economic power
through its bilateral relations. During the week of
January 13-20, 1978, Japanese Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda
made a visit to the middle eastern countries of Saudi Arabia,
the United Arab Emirates, Iran, and Kuwait. The purpose of
Mr. Sonoda' s trip was to reassure these countries of Japan's
sincere commitment to their development plans. This trip
was considered necessary because of delays which had crept
into some of the development programs negotiated some four
years ago.
On the other hand, Japan still needs reassurances from
the Arab state's concerning the relative stability of oil
prices on the world market. Without those assurances, Japan
will be at a distinct disadvantage as it tries to cope with
U.S. and European pressures for accelerated trade and
growth within Japan's domestic economy. A sudden Arab price
increase on oil would disrupt Japanese planning and her
ability to accept increased foreign imports.
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Mr. Sonoda's recent trip especially helped
to underpin relations with Saudi Arabia,
where Japanese credibility had been badly
undermined by foot-dragging on a promise
to help the Saudis build a multi-million
dollar petro-chemical plant. As a result
of the Foreign Minister's visit a feasi-
bility study on the plant has been expe-
dited, and plans call for a possible start
of construction later this year. 125
In view of the urgency with which these various projects
were initially negotiated, delays of four to five years
before construction commencement do seem unusually excessive.
On the other hand, OPEC did conspire to quadruple the price
of oil in 1973, an action which could hardly have been
termed a "good-faith" gesture. Economic hostility with the
Middle East, however, is not in Japan's best interests at
any time during the remainder of this century.
Japan is experiencing heavy pressures, from Europe and
the United States, to expand her market and accelerate her
economy in order to absorb more imports. The Middle East is
rich and becoming richer, offering Japan a growing opportun-
ity for expanding export markets in that area. Middle East
business would help Japan balance her oil deficits, and
reduce the pressures to export in such large quantities to
the U.S. and Europe.
Through bilateral (vertical) negotiation and cooperation,
therefore, Japan seems to be succeeding in her attempts to
1 25 David Tharp, "Japan's Oil Line to the Mideast,"
Christian Science Monitor
,
24 Jan 78, p. 4.
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even the imbalance in her relationships with other nations.
Trade deficits, oil diplomacy, security alliances, and
friendship treaties are all examples of bilateral activities
which are an integral part of Japan's foreign policy.
Through such bilateral relations, Japan hopes to con-
tinue to elude the hegemonial influence of the major powers,
while at the same time still maintain her place in the
strategic, economic, and political balance of power in the
western Pacific. It is a neutralist sort of policy. It is
a policy which recognizes an interdependent world, in which
no single actor can maintain autarky or absolute autonomy
for very long.
Japan's vertical cooperation provides flexibility in
the face of social change in either country. Change being
a near-absolute certainty in today's world, it would seem
that "united fronts," military blocs, collective organiza-
tions and the like are losing their battles for longevity.
Collectives require two forms of cooperation and sacrifice;
each nation must first forego certain disputes for the
benefit of collective unity, and may have to sacrifice again
in the face of another collective's opposition. Vertical
cooperation, eliminating the possibility of disharmony
within a group, is more efficient. In Japan's case, it has
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The kinds of solutions which Japan has chosen to incor-
porate into her oil -resource strategy are not unusual,
unique or radical. Her investments are sound. Her political
posture does not involve turning cartwheels for the pleasure
of either producers nor other consumers. Rather it exemplifies
a concerted, determined effort to approach those nations,
with whom she must deal, from a position of economic partner-
ship, seeking to enhance mutual benefits.
Japan must face her economic future in a changing world
through increased involvement with developing nations, yet
still maintain enough flexibility to maximize her policy
options in the event of unforeseen crises. Such flexibility
may mean a neutralist stance in future postures, with some
departure from U.S. policy lines.
There is no question that Japan's oil dependence is ines-
capable in the near-term, and nothing short of a major tech-
nological breakthrough will change that fact in the long-term.
Even if Japan were wildly successful in her Tyumen oil nego-
tiations, her Chinese oil deals, Indonesian explorations,
and Mexican market penetration, by the mid-1980 ' s she would
still be utterly dependent on the Middle East for more than
70 percent of her total oil requirements.
Unquestionably, other oil sources can be developed.
Sudan is a recent example. But the world is burning up
petroleum resources at an ever- increasing rate. World pro-
ducers are pumping a wide, black river of oil from out of




Given enough time and money, no upper limit on world oil
reserves has yet been established. But over time, the costs
of oil production must rise as oil becomes more scarce.
Eventually the costs of alternative energy sources will seem
cheap by comparison, and the world will convert to the next
more economic substitute. Japan will be among the first to
have to make such a decision. Her choice may have a major
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(*)Real GNP in 1970 prices.
1 7 fi A Guide to Japanese Petroleum Industry , Petroleum



















Abu Dhabi 1298 1412 1403 1590 - 31,000 20,000
Bahrain 68 67 61 58 48 270 3,000
Dubai 220 239 254 315 - 1,400 1,500
Iran 5861 6026 5350 5875 469 62,000 500,000
Iraq 1964 1850 2240 2070 112 34,500 28,000
Israel 88 100 75 1 152 1 20
Kuwait 2761 2276 1807 1820 145 67,000 31,500
Neutral Zone 525 541 496 450 40 6,200 5,000
Oman 293 290 342 365 5,650 2,000
Qatar 570 518 441 485 5,600 40,000
Saudi Arabia 7334 8210 6827 8570 314 150,000 85,000
Sharjah - - 38 40 25 -
Syria 99 132 175 175 72 2,150 3,100
Turkey 66 65 60 67 303 370 540
Asia-Pacific
Afghanistan - - - 150 - 84 2,600
Australia 419 389 409 430 641 2,000 32,000
Bangladesh - - - - - - 8,000
Brunei 320 328 175 200 361 1,550 8,250
Burma 20 20 20 20 40 55 150
Taiwan (China) 2 3 5 4 180 12 700
India 148 149 165 180 535 3,000 3,500
Indonesia 1324 1396 1313 1500 228 10,000 24,000
Japan 15 15 12 10 5195 63 525
Malaysia - - 100 155 364 2,500 1,700
New Zealand - - - 10 129 105 6,000
Pakistan 8 9 6 12 115 280 15,500
Phil ippines - - - - 192 100 -
South Korea - - - - 263 - -




Country (Production 1000 b/d) ( Consumed) (Oil
,
Gas Rese
73 74 75 76 76 Mb / MMcfd
Africa
Algeria 1070 986 946 950 60 6,600 125,000
Angola 154 169 166 47 21 1,160 1,500
Congo Repub. 42 32 38 38 - 360 10
Egypt 165 144 23Q 325 153 2,450 3,200
Gabon 147 177 200 220 - 2,0.50 2,450
Libya 2187 1491 1488 1900 38 25,000 25,700
Morocco - - - - 54 - 44
Nigeria 2Q53 2256 1787 2Q2Q 63 18,700 43,Q0Q
Tunisia 83 88 95 77 38 2,670 6,400
Zaire 1 1 3 20 25 150 50
Europe
Austria 49 46 40 37 23Q 154 49Q
Denmark 4 3 3 3 335 50 1,700
France 26 23 20 20 2385 43 4,800
Germany, W. 129 121 112 158 2885 32Q 7,300
Greece - - - - 21Q 25 4.QQQ
Italy-Sicily 15 19 19 20 197Q 6QQ 8,300
Netherlands 29 30 30 28 80Q 80 6Q,QQQ
Norway 32 35 189 3QQ 8QQ 6,000 20,000
Spain 16 37 36 34 955 265 20Q
U.K. 2 2 12 230 1870 19,000 29,000
Yugoslavia 68 67 75 70 265 325 1,400
Western Hemispnere
Argentina 418 413 387 390 495 2,503 8,120
Barbados - - .3 .4 - 1 -
Bol ivia 47 49 42 41 - 350 5,000
Brazil 169 179 174 171 795 880 1,200
Canada 1798 1690 1444 1300 1790 6,000 58,000
Chile 32 29 25 24 143 440 2,000
Columbia 199 173 160 146 195 960 6,360





(production 1QQQ b/d) (Consumed) (Oi 1 , Gas Reserves)
73 74 75 76 76 Mb / MMcfd
Guatemala - - - - - 16 -
Mexico 465 551 705 850 675 14,000 30,000
Peru 69 76 73 74 130 730 1,300
Trinidad &
Tobago 164 178 205 224 62 650 8,500
Venezuela 3364 2976 2345 2290 255 18,200 41,000
U.S.A. 9189 8812 8351 8105 16980 29,500 210,000
Communist
Bulgaria - - - 2.4 - 18 71
China 860 1200 1480 1690 1320 20,000 25,000
Czechoslavak ia - - - 2.6 330 19 671
Hungary 41 70 - 152 312 312 4,271
Poland 7 20 - 11 308 81 4,386
Rumania 292 290 - 294 280 2,149 22,592
U.S.S.R. 7975 9176 9820 10365 7500 75,000 920,000
Total World 58676 641,897 2,343,22
^•27 international Petroleum Encyclopedia 1977 , The Petro-
leum Publishing Co., Tulsa, OK, 1977; production statistics
from pages 277-280; consumption statistics from pages 391-
393; estimated proved reserves updated from The Oil and Gas





























1973 % 1976 % % shift
29198 10.10 30893 11.20 + 1.1
67 - - -
200 .10 133 .05 - .05
39 - - -
24 - - -
10637 3.10 12573 4.56 + 1.46
957 .30 164 .06 - .24
1639 .6 7268 2.63 + 2.03
2028 .7 846 .31 - .39
- - 90 -
42433 14.7 33494 12.14 - 2.56
89508 31.0 53958 19.56 -11.44
978 .3 8345 3.02 + 2.72
23628 8.2 17619 6. 39 - 1.81
1484 .5 2131 .77 + .27
15406 5.3 11373 4.12 - 1.18
5350 1.9 242 .09 - 1.81
5365 1.9 9457 3.43 + 1.53
216 .1 495 .18 + .08
i
57397 19.9 86409 31. 33 +11.43
78 - - - i
1423 .5 93 .04 - .46
554 .2 334 .12 - .08 )
288,609 100 275,827 100
PERCENT OPEC 1973 / 92.3% 1976 / 89.24%
12 8 Guide to Japanese Petroleum Industry
,
op.cit., p. 7.
(*) Egypt statistic from the International Petroleum Encyclo -









ENERGY SUPPLY PATTERN (%)
1960 1965 1970 1973 1976
Solid Fuel 41.5 27.3 20.7 15.5 15.4
Liquid Fuel 37.7 58.4 70.8 77.6 74.4
Nuclear - - .4 .6 2.2
Natural Gas 1.0 1.4 1.3 1.5 2.7
Hydro, etc. 19.8 12.9 6.8 4.8 5.3
129
TABLE VIII
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DOMESTIC OIL+GAS / Mkl
DOMESTIC COAL / Mt
NUCLEAR / Mkw
LNG / Mt












39.0(3 3.3 41.0(33.9 51.0 @ 3-9
1.00.3 3.00.7
8.0@ 1.2 111.09 1.7 j 14.0 @ 1.7
I










IMPORTED OIL+GAS / Mkl : 286.0 73.3
24.00 4.9 J3O.O06.4
93.00 10.7 UO20 12.4
i
- 0- j 2.3 .4





(*)Case A represents an extension of present levels of energy conserva-
tion and nuclear/LNG development efforts. (**)Case B represents a maxi-
mum attainable target to be achieved by Government/industry/public
joint efforts to minimize oil imports. (Source :MITI)



















































































PARTICIPATION OF WESTERN OIL COMPANIES I»7 JAPAN'S
OVERSEAS OIL EXPLORATIONS - 1974 133
% Foreign participation Numbers of Japanese Oil
and companies involved companies involved
id n3 m
id O •H
-H •H H >-\ u
0) CO id u U id cuH -p < CD <D u r-i J2
n en •H s E 4-i id |
•a id w u s, 3, (I) u a
•H w • LM • • O 2
s CO < z CO < Eh
USA -
(71.4%)Sun Oil 1 1 1 - 1 1 5
Mobil Oil 1 2 3
Cities Service 1 1 1 3
Continental 1 2 3
Ocean Venture 1 2 3
Union Oil 1 1 2
Stanvac 2 2
Ashland Oil 2 2
Gulf Oil 1 1 2
Getty Oil 1 1 2
Signal Oil 1 1 2




Skelly Oil 1 1 2




Reserve Oil 1 1
UK- City Investing 1 1
(5.3%) British Petroleum 1 1 1 3
France CFP 1 1 1 3
(10. 7%) Aquitaine 1 1
FRAP 1 1 2
Germany-
(3.6%) Deminex 1 1 2
Italy-
(3.6%) AGIP 1 1 2
Belgium-
(1.8%) Cometra 1 1
Canada-
(3.6%) Bour Valley 1 1
Union Oil 1 1






ADVANTAGES OF OVERSEAS INVESTMENT AS PERCEIVED BY
JAPANESE MANUFACTURING FIRMS 134
(1965) (1966-69) (197Q-71)
Number of Cases Reported 367 527 461
Host Countrys' policies of
Protection for Industry 32 25 21
Abundant Supply of Labor 25 36 36
Abundant Supply of Ravr
Materials and Energy Reserves.
.
. 8 5
Abundant Supply of Land and
Water
Proximity to Market
Trade Advantage Between Host
Country and Third Countries
Other











ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF VULNERABILITY 135
Percentage vulnerability by





Areas west of Malacca Straits
Areas west of Hormuth Strait




55.3 43.4 46.6 60.75
91.2 80.7 77.6 80.31
1.4 .2 .5 .04
- -
.6 2.63
91.4 83.1 80.3 80.46
89.1 80.6 77.3 77.29
6.7 16.4 13.6 12.14
35.9 37.3 31.0 19.56
18.2 16.7 19.9 31. 33
16.3 13.6 12.14
Degree of diversification:
Least number of countries
supplying 20 percent
Least number of countries
supplying 50 percent
1-Iran 1-Iran 1-Iran 1-Saudi
Arabia
1 "3 CXJJ Wu, op.cit., Adaptation from Table 20, p. 73. Data for
1976 adapted from Guide to Japanese Petroleum Industry , op.cit.
p. 7
.
Direct import only, excluding swap.
i_
Obtained by subtracting Iraq from the Middle East total
because of the pipeline to the Mediterranean. Amount of oil
from Saudi Arabia dependent upon transit through the Persian
Gulf would be lower to the extent the Trans-Arabian pipeline
might be used.
Add Saudi Arabia or Kuwait or Neutral Zone.
Add Saudi Arabia or Indonesia or Kuwait





TREATY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP
BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1 Sb
JAPAN AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, RECALLING WITH
SATISFACTION THAT SINCE THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN AND THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ISSUED A JOINT
COMMUNIQUE IN PEKING ON SEPTEMBER 29, 1972, THE FRIENDLY
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AND THE PEOPLES OF
THE TWO COUNTRIES HAVE DEVELOPED GREATLY ON A NEW BASIS.
CONFIRMING THAT THE ABOVE MENTIONED JOINT COMMUNIQUE
CONSTITUTES THE BASIS OF THE RELATIONS OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP
BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES AND THAT THE PRINCIPLES ENUNCIATED
IN THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE SHOULD BE STRICTLY OBSERVED.
CONFIRMING THAT THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS SHOULD BE FULLY RESPECTED.
HOPING TO CONTRIBUTE TO PEACE AND STABILITY IN ASIA AND
IN THE WORLD.
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SOLIDIFYING AND DEVELOPING THE RELATIONS
OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.
HAVE RESOLVED TO CONCLUDE A TREATY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP
AND FOR THAT PURPOSE HAVE APPOINTED AS THEIR PLENIPOTENTIARIES:
JAPAN: MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SUNAO SONODA
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HUANG HUA
WHO, HAVING COMMUNICATED TO EACH OTHER THEIR FULL POWERS,
FOUND TO BE IN GOOD AND DUE FORM, HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
ARTICLE 1
1. THE CONTRACTING PARTIES SHALL DEVELOP RELATIONS OF PERPETUAL
PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES ON THE BASIS OF
THE PRINCIPLES OF MUTUAL RESPECT FOR SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL
INTEGRITY, MUTUAL NONAGGRESSION , NON-INTERFERENCE IN EACH OTHER'S
INTERNAL AFFAIRS, EQUALITY AND MUTUAL BENEFIT AND PEACEFUL CO-
EXISTENCE.
2. THE CONTRACTING PARTIES CONFIRM THAT, IN CONFORMITY WITH
THE FOREGOING PRINCIPLES AND THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF
THE UNITED NATIONS, THEY SHALL IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS SETTLE
ALL DISPUTES BY PEACEFUL MEANS AND SHALL REFRAIN FROM THE USE
OR THREAT OF FORCE.

ARTICLE 2
THE CONTRACTING PARTIES DECLARE THAT NEITHER OF THEM
SHOULD SEEK HEGEMONY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION OR IN ANY
OTHER REGION AND THAT EACH IS OPPOSED TO EFFORTS BY ANY
OTHER COUNTRY OR GROUP OF COUNTRIES TO ESTABLISH SUCH
HEGEMONY.
ARTICLE 3
THE CONTRACTING PARTIES SHALL, IN THE GOOD-NEIGHBORLY
AND FRIENDLY SPIRIT AND IN CONFORMITY WITH THE PRINCIPLES
OF EQUALITY AND MUTUAL BENEFIT AND NON-INTERFERENCE IN EACH
OTHER'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, ENDEAVOR TO FURTHER DEVELOP
ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES
AND TO PROMOTE EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE PEOPLES OF THE TWO
COUNTRIES.
ARTICLE 4
THE PRESENT TREATY SHALL NOT AFFECT THE POSITION OF
EITHER CONTRACTING PARTY REGARDING ITS RELATIONS WITH THIRD
COUNTRIES.
ARTICLE 5
1. THE PRESENT TREATY SHALL BE RATIFIED AND SHALL ENTER INTO
FORCE ON THE DATE OF THE EXCHANGE OF INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICA-
TION WHICH SHALL TAKE PLACE AT TOKYO. THE PRESENT TREATY
SHALL REMAIN IN FORCE FOR 10 YEARS AND THEREAFTER SHALL
CONTINUE TO BE IN FORCE UNTIL TERMINATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 2.
2. EITHER CONTRACTING PARTY MAY, BY GIVING ONE YEAR'S
WRITTEN NOTICE TO THE OTHER CONTRACTING PARTY, TERMINATE THE
PRESENT TREATY AT THE END OF THE INITIAL 10 -YEAR PERIOD OR
AT ANY TIME THEREAFTER.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF THE RESPECTIVE PLENIPOTENTIARIES HAVE
SIGNED THE PRESENT TREATY AND HAVE AFFIXED THERETO THEIR SEALS
DONE IN DUPLICATE, IN THE JAPANESE AND CHINESE LANGUAGES
BOTH TEXTS BEING EQUALLY AUTHENTIC, AT PEKING, THIS TWELFTH
DAY OF AUGUST, 1978.
English translation of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship




Abrahamsson, Bernard J. and Steckler, Joseph L. , Strategic
Aspects of Seaborne Oil , Sage Publications, Beverly
Hills, CA, 1973.
Adelman, Morris A., et.al., No Time to Confuse , Institute
for Contemporary Studies, San Francisco, CA, 1975.
A Guide to Japanese Petroleum Industry , Petroleum Associa-
tion of Japan, Tokyo, October 1977.
Anderson, Kent P. and DeHaven, James C. , The Long- Run Mar-
ginal Costs of Energy , R-1590-NSF, Rand Corporation, CA,
February 1975.
Anthony, John Duke, The Middle East: Oil, Politics, and
Development , American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research, Washington, DC, 1975.
Asia Yearbook 1978 , Far Eastern Economic Review Ltd. , Hong
Kong, 1978.
Blair, John M. , The Control of Oil , Random House, Inc., New
York, NY, 1976.
Bucknell III, Howard, Energy Policy and Naval Strategy , Sage
Publications, Beverly Hills, CA, 1975.
Burright, Burke K. and Enns , John H. , Econometric Models of
the Demand for Motor Fuel , R-1561-NSF/FEA, Rand Corpora-
tion, CA, April 1975.
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, The Fragile Blossom , Harper and Row
Publishers, New York, NY, 1972.
Cambell, Robert W. , The Economics of Soviet Oil and Gas
,
Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Maryland, 196 8.
Carmoy , Guy de , Energy For Europe: Economic and Political
Implications
,
American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research, Washington, DC, 1977.
Chawla, Sudershan, Gurtov, Melvin and Marsot, Alain-Gerard,
eds
.
, Southeast Asia Under the New Balance of Power
,
Praeger Publishers, New York, NY, 1974.
Clough, Ralph N. , East Asia and U.S. Security , The Brookings
Institution, Washington, DC, 1975.
115

Cook, Earl F. , Man, Energy, Society , W.H. Freeman and Co.,
San Francisco, CA, 1976.
Emmerson, John K. , Arms, Yen and Power: The Japanese Dilemma
,
Dunnellen, New York, NY, 1971.
Emmerson, John K. and Humphreys, Leonard A., Will Japan Re-
Arm?, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, Washington, DC, 1973.
Eppen, Gary, ed. , Energy: The Policy Issues , University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1975.
Erickson, Edward W. and Waverman, Leonard, eds
.
, The Energy
Question, An International Failure of Policy , University
of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1974.
Fifield, Russell H. , Americans in Southeast Asia: The Roots
of Commitment , Twentieth Century Fund, Thomas Y. Crowell
Company, New York, NY, 197 3.
Ford Foundation Energy Project, A Time to Choose - America's
Energy Future , Ballinger Publishing Company, Cambridge,
Mass. , 1974.
Fried, Edward R. and Schultze, Charles L. , eds., Higher Oil




Hayes, Denis, Rays of Hope: The Transition to a Post-Petro-
leum World
,
W.W. Norton and Co., Inc., New York, 1977.
Heilbroner, Robert L. , The Great Ascent: The Struggle for
Economic Development in Our Time
, Harper and Row Publish-
ers, Inc., New York, NY, 1963.
Hellman, Donald C. , ed. , China and Japan: A New Balance of
Power
, D.C. Heath and Co., Lexington, Mass., 1976.
Hellman, Donald C, Japan and East Asia , Praeger Publishers,
New York, NY, 19 72.
Halloran, Richard, Japan: Images and Realities
,
Charles E.
Tuttle Co., Tokyo, 1969.
Holsti, K.J., International Politics : A Framework for Analy -
sis , Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, NJ , 1967.
Howell, Leon and Morrow, Michael, Asia Oil Politics and the
Energy Crisis
, IDOC/International Documentation of North
America, Nos . 60-61, New York, NY, 1974.
116

Houthakker, Hendrik S. , The World Price of Oil: A Medium
Term Analysis , American Enetrprise Institute for Public
Policy Research, Washington, DC, 1976.
International Petroleum Encyclopedia 1975 , The Petroleum
Publishing Comapany, Tulsa, OK, 1975.
International Petroleum Encyclopedia 1977 , The Petroleum
Publishing Comapany, Tulsa, OK, 19 77.
Johnson, Sheila K. , American Attitudes Toward Japan, 19 41 -
1975 , American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, Washington, DC, 1975.
Kahn, Herman, Brown, William and Mertel, Leon, The Next
200 Years: A Scenario for America and the World , William
Morrow and Co., Inc., New York, NY, 1976.
Kojima, Kiyoshi, Japan and a New World Economic Order , West-
view Press, Boulder, CO, 1977.
Kosnik, Joseph T. , Natural Gas Imports from the Soviet Union
,
Praeger Publishers, New York, NY, 1975.
Langdon, Frank C. , Japan's Foreign Policy , University of
British Columbia Press, Vancouver, BC, 1973.
Langer, Paul F. and Moorsteen, Richard, The U. S
.
/Japanese
Military Alliance: Japanese Perceptions and the Prospec-
tive Impact of Evolving U.S. Doctrines and Technologies
,
P-5393, Rand Corporation, CA, January 1975.
Lea, Sperry, Higher Oil Prices: Worldwide Financial Implica-
tions , British-North American Committee, Washington, DC,
1975.
Lebra, Takie Sugiyama, Japanese Patterns of Behavior , Univer-
sity Press of Hawaii, HI, 1976.
Lenczowski, George, Middle East Oil in a Revolutionary Age
,
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research,
Washington, DC, 1976.
Lockwood, William W. , ed. , The State and Economic Enterprise
in Japan: Essays in the Political Economy of Growth
,
Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1965.
McGaffin, Ed and Langer, Paul, Science and Technology in
Japan—A Brief Analytic Survey , R-1736-ARPA, Rand Corpora-
tion, CA, November 1975.
117

McNelly, Theodore, Politics and Government in Japan ,
Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 19 72.
Meadows, Donella H. , et.al., The Limits to Growth , The New
American Library Inc., New York, NY, 1974.
Meier, Gerald M. , Problems of Trade Policy , Oxford Univer-
sity Press, New York, NY, 1973.
Mesarovic, Mihajlo and Pestel, Eduard, Mankind at the Turn-
ing Point: The Second Report to the Club of Rome , The
New American Library Inc., New York, NY, 1974.
Mitchell, Edward J., U.S. Energy Policy: A Primer , American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research,
Washington, DC, 1974.
Morgenthau, Hans J. , Politics Among Nations: The Struggle
for Power and Peace , Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 19 73.
Morely, James William, ed. , Forecast for Japan: Security in
the 19 70 's , Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ
,
1972.
Murray, F.W., Jaquette, D.L. and King, W.S., Hazards Associ -
ated with the Importation of Liquefied Natural Gas ,
R-1845-RC, Rand Corporation, CA, June 1976.
Norbeck, Edward, Changing Japan , Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
New York, NY, 1976.
O'Dell, Peter R. , Oil and World Power: Background to the Oil
Crisis , Penguin Books, Baltimore Maryland, 197 5.
Ohkawa, Kazushi and Rosovsky, Henry, Japanese Economic
Growth , Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 1973.
Okazaki, Hisahiko, A Japanese View of Detente, D.C. Heath
and Co., Lexington, Mass., 1974.
Patrick, Hugh and Rosovsky, Henry, eds
.
, Asia's New Giant :
How the Japanese Economy Works , The Brookings Institu-
tion, Washington, DC, 1976.
Price, Willard, The Japanese Miracle and Peril , Hayden Book
Co. , New York, NY, 197 2.
Reischauer, Edwin 0., The United States and Japan , The Viking
Press, New York, NY, 1965.
113

Scalapino, Robert A., Asia and the Road Ahead , University
of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1975.
Scalapino, Robert A. , ed. , The Foreign Policy of Modern
Japan, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA,
1977.
Spekke, Andrew A. , ed. , The Next 25 Years: Crisis and Op-
portunity , World Future Society, Washington, DC, 1975.
Spero, Joan Edelman, The Politics of International Econo-
mic Relations , St. Martin's Press, New York, NY, 1977.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Oil and
Security , Humanities Press, New York, NY, 1974.
Szyliowicz, Joseph S. and O'Neill, Bard E., The Energy Crisis
and U.S. Foreign Policy , Praeger Publishers, New York,
NY, 1975.
Tanzer, Michael, The Political Economy of International Oil
and the Underdeveloped Countries , Beacon Press, 3oston,
1969.
The Pacific Rivals: A Japanese View of Japanese-American
Relations
,
Asahi Shimbun Staff, Weatherhili/Asahi
,
New York/Tokyo, 1972.
The Petroleum Industry in Japan 1976 , The Japanese National
Committee of the World Petroleum Congresses, Tokyo, 1976.
Toffler, Alvin, Future Shock , Random House Inc., New York,
NY, 1970.
US Congress, House Hearings, Shifting Balance of Power in
Asia: Implications for Future U.S. Policy , Committee
on International Relations, 94th Congress, 18MAY76,
US GPO, 1976.
US Congress, House Hearings, U.S. International Energy
Policy
,
Committee on International Relations, 94th
Congress, 1st Session, 1MAY75, US GPO, 1975.
US Congress, Senate Hearings, United States Security Agree-
ments and Commitments Abroad
,
Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, Volume II, 91st Congress, US GPO, 1971.
US Congress, Senate Hearings, Political and Economic Factors
Governing Access to Energy in the Decades Ahead , Com-
mittee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Congress,
1st Session, 1FEB77, US GPO, 1977.
119

Vogel, Ezra F., Modern Japanese Organization and Decision-
Making , University of California Press, Berkeley, CA,
1975.
Vreeland, Nena, et.al., Area Handbook for Indonesia , US GPO,
Washington, DC, 1975.
Ward, Robert E. , Japan's Political System , Prentice-Hall
Inc., Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1967.
Weinstein, Martin E. , Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, 1947 -
1968 , Columbia University Press, New York, NY, 1971.
Wells, Donald A., Saudi Arabian Development Strategy , Amer-
ican Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research,
Washington, DC, 19 76.
White Papers of Japan 1975-76 , Japan Institute of Inter-
national Affairs, Tokyo, 1977.
Workshop on Alternative Energy Strategies, Energy : Global
Prospects 1985-2000
,
Massachusetts Institute of Techno-
logy, McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York, NY, 1977.
Wu, Yuan-li, Japan's Search for Oil , Hoover Institution-
Press, Stanford, CA, 1977.
Zacher, Mark W. and Milne, R. Stephen, eds., Conflict and





Abelson, Philip H. , "Public Opinion and Energy Use", Science
30SEP77.
Abelson, Philip H. , "Intercountry Energy Comparison",
Science , 10FEB78.
"A Game that Stresses Energy Conservation" , Christian Science
Monitor , 170CT77.
Akbar, Youssef , "Iran ' s Energy Policy", Middle Eastern
Economic Survey , 7NOV7 6.
"A Portrait of Diversification" , Far Eastern Economic
Review , 25 MAR74.
"Arab Holdings Cited as Possible Threat to West" , Monterey
Peninsula Herald
, 18SEP77.
"Asia Gears Up for the Squeeze", Far Eastern Economic
Review , 2 6NOV7 3.
Aulderidge, Larry, "World Reserves, Operations Hit New Highs",
The Oil and Gas Journal , 26DEC77.
"Back of America's Trade Impasse With Japan", US News and
World Report , 15MAY78.
Berg, Charles A. , "Process Innovation and Changes In Industrial
Energy Use", Science , 10FEB78.
Bowering, Philip, "Arab Reserve Weapons", Far Eastern Economic
Review
, 220CT73.
Brown, Lester R. , "Global Economic Ills—The Worst May Be
Yet to Come", The Futurist
,
June, 1978.
Brown, Norman L. and Howe, James W. , "Solar Energy for Vil-
lage Development", Science , 10FEB78.
Buckley, William F. , "Deregulation of Oil", Monterey Penin-
sula Herald
, 7APR78.
Burchett, Wifred, "Chinese Tap Taching Potential", Far East -
ern Economic Review , 14JAN74.




Carter, James E. , "Nuclear Power Policy", Weekly Compila-
tion of Presidential Documents , 11APR77.
Carter, Luther J., "Coal: Invoking the Rule of Reason in
an Energy-Environment Conflict", Science, 210CT77.
Carter, Luther J., "Nuclear Wastes: Popular Antipathy
Narrows Search for Disposal Sites, Science , 23SEP77.
Carter, Luther J., "Peat for Fuel: Development Pushed By
Big Corporate Firm in Carolina", Science , 6JAN78.
Carter, Luther J., "Sweetness and Light from Industry and
Environmentalists on Coal", Science , 3MAR78.
"China Nuclear Development Called Slow" , Aviation Week and
Space Technology , 29AUG77.
"Chronology", Japan Quarterly , Vol XX No 4 , OCT-DEC73
through Vol XXII No 1, JAN-MAR75.
Cooley, John K. , "Oil Poor Sudan Reported to Have Struck
It Rich", Christian Science Monitor , 24MAY78.
Cooley, John K. , "OPEC Makes Inroads in Oil Marketing",
Christian Science Monitor , 26AUG77.
Crowe Jr., William, "Oil: U.S. Navy vs. the Soviets",
Christian Science Monitor , 18MAY78.
"Crucial Role for Red Oil", Time
, 6FEB78.
"Developing Timan-Pechora Gas, Minerals", The Current Digest
of the Soviet Press , 27APR77.
Dillin, John, "China's Struggling Economy", Christian
Science Monitor , 30AUG77.
"Diversification: The New Oil Game", Business Week , 24APR78.
"Dwindling U.S. Strength in Pacific Worries Commanders",
Monterey Peninsula Herald , 26MAR78.
Ellis, Harry B. , "Arab Money Weapon Shadows Mideast Talks",
Christian Science Monitor , 21SEP77.
Ellis, Harry B. , "Carter Tries to Get Japan to 'Buy US'",
Christian Science Monitor , 13DEC77.
Ellis, Harry B. , "Contradictory Forecasts Muddle Energy
Planning", Christian Science Monitor, 7JUN78.
122

Ellis, Harry B. , "How US Oil-Guzzling Ties to Farm Sales
Abroad", Christian Science Monitor , 27JAN78.
Ellis, Harry B. , "U.S., Allies Disagree on Nuclear Fuel
Policy", Christian Science Monitor , 23MAY78.
Ellis, Harry B. , "U.S. Appetite for Oil Helps Fuel Infla-
tion", Christian Science Monitor , 10JAN78.
Ellis, Harry B. , "Schlesinger on Oil, Gas Key to Future",
Christian Science Monitor , 30DEC77.
Ellis, Harry B. , "West Warning Japan on Trade Imbalance",
Christian Science Monitor , 6DEC77.
"Ex-Sadat Advisor Warns Arabs New Embargo Wouldn't Work
Against U.S.", Piatt's OilGram News , 2 6AUG77.
Fisher, Dan, "Soviet Union's Oil-Gas Reserves Are Staggering",
Monterey Peninsula Herald , 12FEB78.
Flower, Andrew R. , "World Oil Production", Scientific
American , March 1978.
Francis, David R. , "Japan, West Germany Grab Economic
Pump Handle", Christian Science Monitor , 6SEP77.
Francis, David R. , "Why Rap Japan for U.S. -Induced Trade
Surplus?", Christian Science Monitor , 28NOV77.
Francis, David R. , "Why U.S. Presses Japan For Help on
Trade Deficit", Christian Science Monitor , 15DEC77.
"Fukuda to Urge Carter Not to Detach America From Asian
Interests", Monterey Peninsula Herald , 27APR78.
"Fukuda Makes Proposal for Research Fund", Monterey
Peninsula Herald , 5MAY78.
George, G.W.P., "Power to the People", Far Eastern Economic
Review , 24SEP73.
Goodsell, James Nelson, "Oil Profit Plunge Heats Up Election
in Venezuela", Christian Science Monitor , 31MAY78.
Goodstadt, Leo and Bowering, Philip, "Third World: Licking
Lips and Wounds", Far Eastern Economic Review , 11FEB74.
Hafele, Wolf and Sassin, Wolfgang, "Energy Options and





Hammond, Allen L. , "An Interim Look at Energy", Science
,
10FEB78.
Hammond, Allen L. , "Energy: Elements of a Latin American
Strategy", Science , 19MAY78.
Harrison, Selig S., "China: The Next Oil Giant", Foreign
Policy , Fall 1975.
Harsch, Joseph C. , "A Sluggish World Economy Contains Some
Silent Alarms", Christian Science Monitor , 27JAN78.
Harte, John and El-Gasseir, Mohamed, "Energy and Water",
Science , 10FEB78.
Hartman, Carl, "China, Common Market Due to Sign Trade
Treaty", Monterey Peninsula Herald , 3APR78.
Hawkes , Nigel, "Moratorium Set on Antarctic Oil at October
Meeting", Science , 18NOV77.
Hawkes, Nigel, "The Antinuclear Movement Takes Hold",
Science , 16SEP77.
"Here's a Fresh Look at Far-Out Fuels", US News and World
Report , 17APR78.
"High Cost of Russia's Push for Siberian Oil", US News and
World Report , 3APR78.
Holden, Constance, "Ecology and National Security",
Science , 18NOV77.
Howell, Leon and Morrow, Michael, "Arab Actions Alarm Asia",
Far Eastern Economic Review , 5NOV7 3.
Howell, Leon and Morrow, Michael, "Asia's Own Persian Gulf",
Far Eastern Economic Review , 17DEC73.
Howell, Leon and Morrow, Michael, "Inside the Arab Mind",
Far Eastern Economic Review , 10DEC73.
Howell, Leon and Morrow, Michael, "Oil Exploration: Formidible
Task for Peking", Far Eastern Economic Review , 31DEC73.
Howell, Leon and Morrow, Michael, "The Energy Game: Asia
Loses", Far Eastern Economic Review , 7JAN74.
Howell, Leon and Morrow, Michael, "The Invisible Gold Hunt"/
Far Eastern Economic Review, 10CT7 3.
L24

Howell, Leon and Morrow, Michael, "The Oil Storm Spills
Into Asia", Far Eastern Economic Review , 12NOV73.
"Hua Asks Chinese to Make Nation Modern by 2000" , Monterey
Peninsula Herald , 2 5MAR7 3.
Hymans, Henri, "Oil Eclipses the Rising Sun", Far Eastern
Economic Review , 17DEC73.
"Indonesia's Credit Improves as Pertamina Reduces Its Debt",
Piatt's OilGram News , 16AUG77.
"Iraq: Japan Wins $16 Million Contract", Middle East Economic
Digest , 27MAY77.
"Iraq: $2000 Million Expected From Japan", Middle East Economic
Digest , 290CT76.
Jameson, Sam, "Japan May Not Trim Its Surplus Fund", Monterey
Peninsula Herald , 25MAR78.
"Japan" , Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Asia & Pacific
,
October 1977 through March 1978.
"Japan Agrees to Slice the Surplus", Time , 23JAN78.
"Japan: Agreement On Sakhalin Oil and Gas Development", Asian
Recorder , 26FEB-4MAR75
.
"Japan: Bid For Supply of (Nuclear) Plant To USSR", Asian
Recorder , 17-23JUN76. (parenthesis added)
"Japan Building Own Uranium Fuel Plant" , Monterey Peninsula
Herald
, 28AUG73.
"Japan: Energy Conservation Programme", Asian Recorder
,
5-11FEB75.
"Japanese Are Asking 5-Yr Delay For Malacca Strait Restric-
tions", Piatt's OilGram News , 25AUG77.
"Japanese Commission Proposes Ambitious 15-Year Space Plan"
,
Aviation Week and Space Technology , 27MAR78.
"Japanese Establishing Hold For European Sales Efforts",
Monterey Peninsula Herald , 28DEC77.




"Japan: Loan for Siberian Gas Project", Asian Recorder ,
6-12AUG75.
"Japan: Nuclear Fuel Plant", Asian Recorder , 29JAN-4FEB75
.
"Japan Officials to Cut Tariffs Expand Imports", Monterey
Peninsula Herald , 14DEC77.
"Japan: Oil Exploration Agreement With USSR", Asian Recorder ,
19-25FEB77.
"Japan: Oil Purchases From China", Asian Recorder , 16-22APR75
"Japan: Premier Defines Targets for 1977", Asian Recorder ,
19-25FEB77.
"Japan: Pro-Arab Policy", Asian Recorder , 19-25MAR75.
"Japan's Fukuda Names New Cabinet In Crisis", Monterey Penin-
sula Herald , 28NOV77.
"Japan's Risky Trade Surplus", Christian Science Monitor
,
2 3NOV77.




"Japan's Total Commitment Called Lesson", Christian Science
Monitor , 17MAR78.
"Japan: Uranium From Seawater" , Asian Recorder , 19-25FEB77.
"Japan Viewed Ready to Meet American Trade Demands",
Monterey Peninsula Herald , 30NOV77.
"Japan: White Paper on Atomic Energy", Asian Recorder
,
22-28JAN77.
Johnson, D. Gale, "Do Trade Barriers Cause Shortages?",
Christian Science Monitor , 12JAN78.




Kim, Sam-O, "An Arab Stake in the Equity", Far Eastern
Economic Review , 10JUN74.
Knickerbocker, Brad, "Methane From Lowly Seaweed", Christian
Science Monitor , 7SEP77.
Kulkarni, U .. G., "Japan Sets Out to Build China Trade,"
Christian Science Monitor , 25AUG78.





Lenrovitz, Jeffrey M. , "U.S. Pledges Continued Asia Strength",
Aviation Week and Space Technology , 27FEB78.
Lipinsky, E.S. /'Fuels From Biomass: Integration with Food
and Materials Systems", Science , 10FEB78.
MacLeod, Alexander , "Nations Attempting to Pool Key Data on
Nuclear Fuels," Christian Science Monitor , 9DEC77.
Maugh II, Thomas H. , "Oil Shale: Prospects on the Upswing..
Again", Science , 9DEC77.
Maugh II, Thomas H. , "Tar Sands: A New Fuels Industry Takes
Shape", Science , 17FEB78.
Mazet, Horace S., "Tapping the Earth's Pool of Energy",
Monterey Peninsula Herald Weekender Magazine , 28AUG77.
McArthur, George , "Future of Indonesia's Industry Called
Bleak", Monterey Peninsula Herald , 8APR78.
McBride, Stewart D. , "Third World Holds Key to Year 2000",
Christian Science Monitor , 7APR78.
Metz , William D. , "Department of Energy: Opposition Rises
as the Plan Leaks Out", Science , 16SEP77.
Metz, William D., "Ocean Thermal Energy: The Biggest Gamble
in Solar Power", Science , 140CT77.
Metz, William D., "Wind Energy: Large and Small Systems
Competing", Science , 2SEP77.
Moorhead, John D., "Japanese German Trade Balances Rock the
Boat", Christian Science Monitor , 190CT77.
Moorhead, John D. , "New Ideas for Generating Fuel for
Natural Gas Pipelines", Christian Science Monitor , 29NOV77
Moritz, Frederick A., "China Departs From Mao's Economic
Policy", Christian Science Monitor , 15SEP77.
Moritz, Frederick A., "China Set to Fire Up Economy",
Christian Science Monitor , 15DEC77.
Moritz, Frederick A., "Chinese-Thai Oil Pact Hint at New
Cooperation", Christian Science Monitor , 7APR78.
Moritz, Frederick A., "Island Spat Clouds China-Japan Pact",
Christian Science Monitor , 18APR78.
Nakamikado , Yuko, "Japan Tiptoes Ahead on Peaceful Nuclear
Energy", Christian Science Monitor , 40CT77.
127

Nakamura, Koji, "For Japan, Zero-Growth Pains", Far Eastern
Economic Review , 26NOV73.
Nakamura, Koji, "Japan Braces For Crisis '74", Far Eastern
Economic Review , 31DEC73.
Nakamura, Koji, "Japan: Drilling Into Scandal", Far Eastern
Economic Review , 15APR74.
Nakamura, Koji, "Japan: The Gear Shift Jams", Far Eastern
Economic Review , 19NOV73.
Nakamura, Koji, "Japan vs the US: New Agonies", Far Eastern
Economic Review, 12NOV73.
Nef, John U. , "An Early Energy Crisis and Its Consequences",
Scientific American , November 1977.
"Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Due" , Christian Science
Monitor , 7JUN78.
"Oil Crunch Looms in '80s for Soviet Union, Says CIA",
Christian Science Monitor , 8SEP77.
"Oil Warning Urges Steps to Head Off World Chaos", Christian
Science Monitor , 1QAPR78.
Oka, Takashi, "Europe Prods Japan on Trade", Christian
Science Monitor , 31JAN7 8.
Oka, Takashi, "Europe's Nuclear Debate", Christian Science
Monitor
, 13APR7 8.
Oka, Takashi, "Japanese Debate Closer Ties With China",
Christian Science Monitor , 9SEP77.
Oka, Takashi, "Japan: Shape Up or Ship Elsewhere", Christian
Science Monitor , 23FEB78.
Okita, Saburo, "Natural Resource Dependency and Japanese
Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs , July 1974.
"OPEC's Real Problems", The Economist , 9JUL77.
Park, Choon-ho and Cohen, Jerome Alan, "The Politics of
the Oil Weapon", Foreign Policy , Fall 1975.






"Peking Hunts Technology; U.S. Sniffs More Trade", Christian
Science Monitor , 19AUG77.
"Pentagon Slashes Navy's Warship Building Plans", Monterey
Peninsula Herald , 25MAR78.
Pine, Art, "Japan Export Cooperation is Sought", Monterey
Peninsula Herald , 19NOV77.
Pond, Elizabeth, "Japan and Russia: The View From Tokyo",
Foreign Affairs , October 1973.
Prest, Michael, "Caution— the Catchword for Japan's Involve-
ment in M.E. Finance", Middle East Economic Digest ,
24SEP76.
"Reserves: The New Math", Newsweek , 27JUN77.
Rich, Matthew, "China: With Oil, Greater Self-Rekiance"
,
Christian Science Monitor , 1MAR7 8.
Robertson, J.A.L., "The CANDU Reactor System: An Appropriate
Technology", Science , 10FEB78.
Rose, David J. and Lester, Richard K. , "Nuclear Power,
Nuclear Weapons and International Stability" , Scientific
American , April 1978.
Salisbury, David F. , "Electricity From Heat? The Potential
Is Tempting", Christian Science Monitor , 12JUN73.
Salisbury, David F., "The Serious Game of Energy", Christian
Science Monitor , 12DEC77.
Sanjoto, "Expansion at Pertamina" , Far Eastern Economic
Review , 17DEC73.
Scherer, Ron, "Oil Glut Brings Price Discounting", Christian
Science Monitor , 9DEC77.
"Scholars, Scientists Look to 21st Century Policy Matters",
Monterey Peninsula Herald , 14JAN73.
Shapley, Deborah, "Breeder Reactors: Fast Flux Fuel Rods
Subject of Silkwood Charges", Science , 3MAR78.
Shuichi, Miyoshi, "Oil Shock", Japan Quarterly , APR-JUN74.
"Siberian Growth Plans and Growing Pains" , The Current
Digest of the Soviet Press, 12JAN77.
129

"Skillful Checkbook Diplomacy Ties Arab Nations and West
to Riyadh", Monterey Peninsula Herald
, 1JAN78.
Smith, Kingsbury, "Mexico Could Help Ease U.S. Oil Problems-
Lopez", Los Angeles Herald Examiner
, 310CT77.
"Solar Electric Cell May Beat 1986 Deadline", Monterey
Peninsula Herald , 7JUN78.
Southerland, Daniel, "Japanese Visitor Soothes Congress",
Christian Science Monitor
, 4MAY78.
"Soviet Oil Riches Not Easily Available, U.S. Agency Says",
Monterey Peninsula Herald
, 13DEC77.
"Study Blames Growth Policies For Inflation, Unemployment",
Monterey Peninsula Herald , 14MAY7 8.
Subhan, Malcolm, "Japan-EEC Talks", Far Eastern Economic
Review
, 2JUL73.
Sultan, Atef, "Japan Sells Hard to Make Up Oil Deficit",
Middle East Economic Digest
, 5DEC75.
Sultan, Atef, "Project Delays Mar Otherwise Flourishing
Relations", Middle East Economic Digest , 24SEP76.
Swabb Jr., L.E., "Liquid Fuels From Coal: From R & D to
Industry", Science , 10FEB7 8.
Takahashi, Kamekichi, "Japan's Changing Growth Factors and
Its Future Prospects", Japanese Economic Studies , Summer
1976.
Tharp, David, "Japanese, Chinese Resume Steps Toward A
Peace Pact", Christian Science Monitor , 28MAR78.
Tharp, David, "Japan's Oil Line to Mideast", Christian
Science Monitor
, 24JAN78.
Tharp, David, "Soviet Arms Trouble Japan", Christian
Science Monitor , 1MAY7 8.
Tharp, David, "U.S., Japan: Big Issues Quickly", Christian
Science Monitor , 2MAY7 8.
Tharp, David, "U.S. and Japan Reach First Stage of Trade
Accord", Christian Science Monitor
, 16JAN78.
"The Oil Crisis: In Perspective", Daedalus, Fall 1975.
150

"The Oil Story", The Economist , 26APR75.
"The World's Energy Resources", The Petroleum Economist
,
July 1975.




Thompson, Scott, "Japan Debates Security As U.S. Pulls Out
of Korea", Christian Science Monitor , 12AUG78.
"U.S. Agrees to Japanese A-Plant Plans", Monterey Penin-
sula Herald , 1SEP77.
"U.S., Japan Bilateral Talks Remain Stalemated", Aviation
Week and Space Technology , 3APR78.
"USSR-Japan Relations: Bad to Worse?", The Current Digest
of the Soviet Press , 6JUL77.
Wakaizumi, Kei, "Consensus In Japan", Foreign Policy
,
Summer 1977.
Willis, David K. , "Soviet-Japanese Bargaining Breaks Off",
Christian Science Monitor , 12JAN78.
Wishart, R.S., "Industrial Energy in Transition: A Petro-
chemical Perspective", Science , 10FEB78.








"World Resources Situation: Petroleum", Congressional Digest
AUG-SEP75.




Yamani, Ahmed Zaki, "The Legitimate Interests of the Petro-
leum Exporting Countries", Middle Eastern Economic
Survey
, 12DEC75.
"Yemen: Japanese Firm to Reconstruct Mokha Port", Middle
East Economic Digest , 17JUN77.




C. REPORTS, MISC .
Bureau of Public Affairs, International Collusive Action
in World Markets for Nonfuel Minerals , Department of
State Publication 8775, Washington, DC, August 1974.
China Oil Production Prospects , ER 77-1003OU, Central Intelli-
gence Agency, Washington, DC, June 1977.
Company Acreage and Activity Statistics 1977 , Petroconsultants
S.A., Geneva, Switzerland, 1977.
Defense of Japan, 1977 , Japan Defense Agency, Tokyo, 1977.
Economic Indicators , Central Intelligence Agency, Office of
Economic Research Weekly Publication, ER EI
77-022, 023,024,025,026, 2JUNE through 30JUNE, 1977.
Freed, James Lowell, The US-Japan Alliance: 1951-1976 ,
Naval Postgraduate School Master's Thesis, DEC76.
How the Energy Crunch Affects Japan , The United States-Japan
Trade Council, Inc., Washington, DC, uncopyrighted
material, cl977.
International Energy Situation: Outlook to 1985 , ER 77-
10240U, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC,
April 1977.
International Oil Developments , ER10DSS 77-011, Central
Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC, 1JUN77.
Japanese Oil Statistics Today , Petroleum Association of
Japan, Tokyo, September 19 77.
Major Petroleum Refining Centers for Export , ER 77-10140,
Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC, April 77.
Mendershausen, H. and Nehring, Richard, Protecting the U.S.
Petroleum Market Against Future Denials of Imports ,
R-1603-ARPA, Rand Corporation, CA, October 1974.
Mohr, April Doreen, Japan's Foreign Policy: Metamorphosis
In Asia , Naval Postgraduate School Master's Thesis,
MAR7 6.
Murray, Thomas H., Problems of Finding Oil , Interview,
Chevron Overseas Petroleum Inc., Information Services
Headquarters, San Francisco, CA, 4APR78.
13 2

Prospects for Soviet Oil Production , ER 77-10270, Central
Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC, April 1977.
Prospects for Soviet Oil Production: A Supplemental Analysis
,
ER 77-10425, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington,
DC, July 1977.
Quarterly Economic Review of Oil in the Far East and
Australasia , The Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd.
,
London, 1976.
Research Aid: Major Oil and Gas Fields of the Free World
,
ER 76-10001, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington,
DC, January 1976.
Research Aid: Natural Gas , ER 77-10062, Central Intelligence
Agency, Washington, DC, February 19 77.
Roberts, Ralph, Some Aspects of Japanese Energy-Conversion
Research and Development , Office of Naval Research,
Department of the Navy, Washington, DC, 2 9FEB7 2.
Trager, Frank N. , The United States and Asia: Future
Relationships
,
Address to Regional Asian Symposium,
Monterey, CA, 14JAN7 8.
US Congress, Joint Study, Soviet Economic Problems and
Prospects
, Joint Economic Committee, 9 5th Congress,
1st Session, 8AUG77, US GPO, 1977.
Wright, Richard L. , The Enigmas and Patterns of Japanese
Economic Investment and Cooperation in Indonesia
,





Defense Documentation Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
Library, Code 0142 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
Department Chairman, Code 56 2
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
Professor C. A. Buss, Code 56Bs 1
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
Professor Boyd Huff, Code 56Hf 2
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
Major Charles Earnhart (Air Force Program Manager) 1
AFIT-CIP
Wright-Patterson AFB , Ohio 45433 (unbound copy)


















21 • ^ o S»-3-3
KAY 6 85 3 0233
Thesis
M5625
c.l
183396
Meyer
Japanese oil depen-
dence*

